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ABSTRACT
Six proverbs on surety for debt present unique difficulties for interpreters of the
Hebrew Bible. Because surety for debt is only occasionally mentioned, the inner-biblical
data is hard-pressed to resolve the many differences of opinion. There is a large body of
primary texts from the ancient Near East that indicates that surety was a widespread
practice in a vast historical period. There is also a large body of secondary literature
focused on these texts. The primary and secondary literature is sufficiently robust as to
warrant a closer look from biblical scholars.
This thesis argues that the extra-biblical texts elucidate the proverbs and presents
a methodological framework by which the two sets of evidence may be compared. The
bodies of evidence are large and similar enough to warrant a contextual method that
assumes a common historical background. Both the proverbs and the ancient Near
Eastern texts reflect legal relationships between parties. The extra-biblical texts are
analyzed for the legal relationships that they reflect and the results of this analysis are
used to elucidate the proverbs. Additionally, these texts are analyzed for the ways in
which they may reflect symbolic ceremonial acts. The proverbs had not been analyzed in
this manner, so similar categories are applied to the proverbs.
The comparative evidence presented supports the conclusion that commentators
have made some unwarranted claims about the proverbs—specifically, about the way in
which they reflect the enactment of surety relationships, their function, and their
historical development. The evidence also supports one position on the relationship of the
parties named in the proverbs. One new suggestion is made regarding the way in which
the surety relationships reflected in Proverbs were likely to have functioned.
ix

INTRODUCTION
At the very heart of Proverbs is wisdom: what does it mean to act wisely before and
towards God and one’s neighbors? Proverbs eloquently and persuasively informs the
reader about wisdom in various affairs ranging from behavior in light of God’s
omniscience to work ethic. Among these subjects is security for debt; in particular, the
folly of securing the debt of a third party (giving surety). Proverbs has six sayings on this
subject (Prov 6:1-5; 11:17; 17:18; 20:16 // 27:13; and 22:26-27). Collectively, they are
the richest biblical source on surety for debt, although the subject occasionally comes up
in other prose and poetic texts.
There are a handful of difficulties in the exegesis of these proverbs. For example,
commentators disagree on the basic structure of the surety arrangement, suggesting
different identities for characters named in the texts (especially Prov 6:1-5) as well as
widely varied relationships between those characters. Of course, how one identifies the
characters mentioned in the wisdom sayings may dramatically change their meaning. In
the case of Prov 6:1-5, the addressee receives dramatically different advice depending
upon how one identifies the characters.The debate about the identity of persons in
Proverbs 6:1-5 is complicated, and we will review it in the first chapter. This thesis will
conclude that evidence from the ancient Near East weighs in favor of one of the scholarly
positions on how we ought to identify these characters.
Another difficulty in the exegesis of the surety proverbs is our rather opaque
understanding of the obligations the third party (the surety) has to both the lender and
1
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borrower; the proverbs themselves do not make entirely clear the responsibilities of the
surety and the consequences that they would bear in the event of a default.1 Our study
will argue for a slightly more nuanced understanding of the surety’s responsibilities to
the lender.
A third difficulty in the exegesis of the surety proverbs is the hang-up over how
the surety agreements were enacted. While the proverbs themselves are not very
interested in this question, commentators make it an issue by making claims about how
the addressee of the wisdom sayings might become entangled in such an agreement.
Much of the secondary literature suggests some type of gestural enactment of the surety
arrangement, but we will present evidence that such a claim is unwarranted.
The essential claim of this thesis is that ancient Near Eastern texts elucidate these
proverbs. This happens in three ways. First, the extra-biblical texts help to settle the
disagreement that we mentioned above about the identity of persons by giving us extra
evidence about similar arrangements. Second, the evidence from these texts disallows
some interpretive positions from consideration. Finally, the evidence suggests one new
interpretive possibility for the surety proverbs.
There are many ancient texts of different genres—court records, loan documents,
and private correspondence—that can give us information about surety in the ancient
Near East. Scholars have examined these extra-biblical records on surety for debt from a
number of different angles, including legal and economic history. There is, in fact, quite a
large body of secondary literature on these sources. Notwithstanding the wide attestation

“Surety” may be properly used of persons or in reference to a legal agreement; we will use it in
both ways, and context will always make our meaning clear. The common use of “guarantor” as an
equivalent to “surety” is improper because, strictly speaking, legal guarantees are provided after the fact.
1
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of primary and secondary sources, exegesis of the Proverbs on surety for debt is carried
out almost entirely in isolation from these other bodies of literature. This is probably
because those primary and secondary sources can be difficult to access and collate, and
because discussions in the secondary literature take place mostly within the fields just
mentioned—fields that, prima facie, seem irrelevant to the study of Proverbs.
In the following work, we will survey the proverbs on surety for debt and discuss
some of the difficulties we encounter in interpreting them. We will suggest that it is very
difficult to resolve scholarly differences of opinion on the basis of biblical evidence alone
and that external evidence may be helpful. We will examine scholarship on the ancient
Near Eastern texts as well as what we know about their distribution and argue that it is
possible to helpfully compare them with the proverbs, despite differences of genre. After
presenting a number of the ancient Near Eastern texts and analyzing them on the basis of
the relationships they symbolize between the involved parties and whether they reflect
symbolic acts, we will return to Proverbs. We will compare the extra-biblical texts to the
proverbs and then attempt to resolve some of the difficulties that we identified in chapter
1 in light of the comparative evidence.
The first chapter of this thesis functions as a state of the question and a detailed
introduction to the proverbs on surety for debt. We begin by summarizing the difficulties
in the interpretation of these proverbs, before a detailed discussion of the proverbs. After
this, we will further explore commentary on the proverbs, discussing in detail five
specific problems in recent commentary on the proverbs on surety for debt. These
problems relate: 1) to the role and motivation of the surety, 2) to the way in which the
surety is responsible for the borrower, 3) to the implementation of a surety arrangement
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(gestural or verbal), and 4) to its basic structure (the relationship of the lender, debtor,
and surety to one another).2 The fifth problem is a deficiency—there are very few
references to the ancient Near Eastern sources, and this is most plausibly a sign that they
are not consulted by commentators.
The second chapter is a summary of the ancient Near Eastern records and an
assessment of their comparative value. The goal of this chapter is to outline the records
and to establish an unimpeachable method by which to compare them to the biblical text.
In this chapter, we will attempt a high-level survey of these sources: what are they, where
are they from, and when were they recorded? What are the main findings of the
secondary literature and how are these helpful? And what method may we use for
comparisons with the proverbs? We will argue that the sources must be analyzed with
legal categories because, even though they are not laws, they are records of legal
interactions. As in Proverbs, many of these ancient Near Eastern sources seem to indicate
that surety was a gesturally-enacted legal relationship. We will establish criteria for
discerning whether a source may or may not reflect such a gesture. We will also argue
that the sources must be analyzed in terms of what they symbolize about the
relationship(s) of the involved parties: what does the language indicate about who holds
power, how do they hold it, and what is the responsibility of this or that party at a
particular time?
In chapter 3, we will examine a number of ancient Near Eastern texts up close.
These texts are from across ancient Mesopotamia and record the surety relationship in a
variety of ways. This chapter is not comprehensive (and indeed could not be). There are

2

“Giving surety” is the act, but we will also use “surety” to mean “the one who gave surety.”
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far too many texts, some of which remain unpublished. For the texts that we do examine,
the reader will discover a transcription, and, since these documents are in various
languages and dialects, summary translations. We have carried out analysis of these texts
in two sections: symbolic acts (do the texts reflect a gestural enactment of the surety), and
legal symbolism (what are the relationships of those involved). While no resoundingly
clear pattern emerges from this bipartite analysis, the results are still helpful and we will
summarize them and make use of them in the fourth chapter.
In chapter 4, we will return to the book of Proverbs after again evaluating the
comparative value of the extra-biblical texts. We will also ask the same kinds of
questions about the proverbs as we did of the ancient Near Eastern records: what do the
texts symbolize about the relationships of the parties to one another, and do they reflect a
gesture that enacted surety arrangements? Throughout this discussion, we will make as
much use of the materials examined in chapter 3 as is possible. Then, we will return to
the five problems that we identified in the first chapter: 1) the motivation of the surety, 2)
the mechanism of surety (what is the responsibility of the surety), 3) the enactment of the
surety, 4) and the structure of the surety agreement. Our hope is that this thesis as a whole
will begin to address the fifth problem that we identified, namely, the lack of reference to
extra-biblical texts.
It seems important from the outset to specify very clearly the questions that we
will not try to answer in this thesis. There are several of these. First, we will not be
suggesting some radical new meaning for the Proverbs in question. The most basic
meaning of these proverbs is well-established: legal arrangements that obligate one on
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behalf of a third party are inherently risky. It is foolish to enter into such agreements, and
the wise avoid becoming entangled in them.
We will not provide a lengthy argument for a historical connection between the
Proverbs on surety for debt and the ancient Near Eastern texts that posits a direct or
indirect dependence of the proverbs on the ancient Near Eastern texts. Some features of
the evidence make this quite difficult. So, even though it seems likely to us that there was
a historical connection, we will not focus on it. A very brief argument for such a
connection is presented, but it is only to support minor points of our conclusions. As
such, the reader should not be distracted by this argument, which can be discarded
without great harm if it is found unconvincing. Most of the conclusions that we draw will
not ultimately depend on the existence of a historical connection between the proverbs
and ancient Near Eastern texts.
This study does not contain a comprehensive survey of surety for debt in the
ancient Near East. The primary sources are far too numerous. Surety arrangements are
attested in at least five languages and three discrete dialects over a period of nearly two
thousand years. We have selected from among primary texts on the basis of their
availability to us and to provide at least some evidence from multiple language groups
and historical periods. The wide attestation, while helpful in some ways, presents unique
linguistic problems that cannot all be managed by this author. Additionally, publications
of primary texts are in some cases quite difficult to access. Chapter 4 presents a sample of
the texts. We have made every effort to indicate the remaining primary sources or at least
some secondary material that summarizes the sources.
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Having presented these caveats, we will move on to the first chapter—our first
look at the proverbs on surety for debt and what commentators have said about them.

CHAPTER ONE
PROVERBS ON SURETY FOR DEBT AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
The Old Testament obliquely or directly addresses security for debts around twenty-three
times. Several of these mentions are in Proverbs, wherein surety for debt is explicitly
addressed on six occasions.1 In this chapter, we will examine the relevant biblical
material (beginning in Proverbs before casting a wider net) and current interpretations of
the proverbs. We will argue that there are multiple difficulties in the interpretation of
surety for debt that remain unresolved, and we will demonstrate that a number of the
solutions proposed for these problems are speculative.
It is, perhaps, best to begin with a brief summary of the state of interpretation of
security for debt in Proverbs. There are five problems in commentary on the proverbs
which stand unresolved. First, there is little consensus regarding the motivation of the
person who gave surety. Some commentators take the surety as having charitable motives
(Tikva Frymer-Kensky and Roland Murphy), while others suggest that the surety is
motivated by financial gain (Michael Fox and Timothy Sandoval).2 Both are possible,
and one position is asserted over against the other on minimal evidence. Second, the
mechanism of the surety agreement is not well-defined; commentators are not clear

Prov 6:1-5; 11:15; 17:18; 20:16; 22:26; 27:13. I have referred to these throughout as “the
proverbs” (no capital), “the proverbs on surety for debt,” or “the surety proverbs.”
1

2
Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Israel,” in Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. Raymond
Westbrook and Richard Jasnow, CHANE 9 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 251–261; Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1-9:
A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 18A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 2000),
215; Roland E. Murphy, Proverbs, WBC 22 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 37; Timothy Sandoval,
The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 108, 111.
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whether the person who gives surety is liable (and to what extent), or whether said person
put at stake some sort of real property.3 Did the surety take on full liability with no
limitations or safeguards, or did they provide property? Third, the way in which the
surety was enacted is not well understood. Some commentators propose a gesture that put
in force the surety’s legal obligation on behalf of the borrower.4 However, it is not clear
whether the two most important verbal forms in the surety proverbs should be taken as
synonymous, or whether one denotes a gesture while the other indicates a verbal
agreement.5 Fourth, there is basic disagreement about the structure of the surety
agreement. Could the surety be released only by the borrower (Bruce Waltke), or only by
the lender (Michael Fox)?6 Fifth, our survey of the secondary literature finds that very
few commentators appeal to extra-biblical data, despite the wide attestation of lending
records among texts from the ancient Near East and a large body of scholarship on
these records.7

3

Leo G. Perdue, Proverbs, IBC (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2000), 124

4

E.g., Perdue, Proverbs, 124.

5

See below, page 19-21.

6

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 212-213. Bruce K. Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1-15, NICOT
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 325.
7
One exception is Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1-15, 330, where he mentions lending
records. Waltke also mistakenly asserts on the same page that “modern commerce is essentially based on
interests on loans, a practice not known in the ancient Near East.” Contra Waltke, see Martha T. Roth, Law
Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, WAW 6 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 62; Edward
Lipínski, The Aramaeans: Their Ancient History, Culture, Religion, OLA 100 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000),
550–551. Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs, OTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999), 75, also
mentions the extra-biblical material in passing.
It is possible to add to the five problems we identified at least two more: 6) a weak understanding
of the historical development of surety, and 7) Zoltán S. Schwáb, Toward and Interpretation of the Book of
Proverbs: Selfishness and Secularity Reconsidered, JTISup 7 (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 111,
suggests that debt-slavery is the consequence envisioned in Prov 6:1-5 without any evidence or
argumentation to support his claim. Was this one of the consequences of surety if the debtor defaulted?
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The problem with the proverbs on surety for debt is that there are many problems:
speculation, little reference to other biblical evidence, and a lack of clear references to
external evidence. In the remainder of this chapter, we will present to the reader a
detailed analysis of the individual proverbs on surety for debt. Throughout, we will refer
to the secondary literature, further illustrating the five problems we have now identified.
Proverbs on Surety for Debt
Of the six biblical wisdom sayings on surety for debt, the longest is Proverbs 6:1-5. This
saying assumes that the addressee (“my son”) has already offered security for another
party and is in serious danger of being obligated to pay the loan (perhaps due to default or
flight) in short order. Proverbs 6:1-5 reads,
My son, if you have given surety (ʿārābtā) for your neighbor, if you have struck
your hands (tāqaʿtā kapekā) for a stranger, then you have been snared by the
speech of your mouth—you have been captured by the speech of your mouth! Do
this, my son, in order to free yourself—for you have come into the power of your
neighbor. Go, humble yourself, and earnestly plead with your neighbor. Do not
give sleep to your eyes, or slumber to your eyelids. Deliver yourself, like a gazelle
from [the] hand [of the hunter], like a bird from the hand of the fowler.8
Before we continue to the other Proverbs, we will describe one of the main difficulties in
the Hebrew text; it provides (even at this very early stage) a taste of the way in which the
interpretation of surety agreements is fragmented.

8

Translations of biblical texts are my own unless otherwise noted. At some points, I have opted
for an overly literal translation in order to maintain consistency with Hebrew terms that are used in lending
and pledges. In Prov 6:1-5, the transition from protasis and apodosis may be thrown forward or back in the
text so that one reads “if you have been snared… if you have been captured, then do this…” or “if you have
given surety, then you have struck your hands.” The LXX reads the first verse as a complete conditional on
its own. See below, page 12, note 15, and page 89, note 11.
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There is a debate as to the identity of the lender and borrower in the text. Is the
lender named in the text—that is, should we take the neighbor as the lender? Is the lender
unnamed? Are the neighbor and the stranger the same person? The most common reading
by far is that the neighbor is the beneficiary of the surety; the neighbor and stranger are
thus equivalents and “neighbor” in Prov 6:1 is thus being used in a broad sense. 9 The
lender is unnamed and in the background. If “neighbor” and “stranger” are parallel to one
another, then the verbs ʿrb and tqʿ are more or less parallel in meaning. The sage exhorts
the addressee to seek release from the borrower.
Michael Fox, among others, takes the neighbor to be the lender and the stranger to
be the borrower.10 Fox suggests that it is counterintuitive that the borrower could release
the surety from his obligation.11 It is more sensible to operate on the assumption that the
borrower and the surety are both obligated to the lender, in which case only the lender
may release the surety.12 “Neighbor” and “stranger” do not refer to the same person in
Prov 6:1, because the surety cannot seek release from the debtor. In other words, even
though there seems to be a neat parallelism between neighbor and stranger in Prov 6:1,
the terms refer to two persons with whom the surety is differently involved.

9
KJV; NET; NIV; NIrV; NRSV is ambiguous. Commentators with a similar approach include
Burton Visotzky, trans., The Midrash on Proverbs, Yale Judaica Series 27 (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1992), 36–38; Waltke, Proverbs 1-15, 335.
10

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 210-216; Timothy J. Sandoval, The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the
Book of Proverbs (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 107; William McKane, Proverbs: A New Approach (London: SCM
Press, 1970), 322.
11

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 212–213.

“Surety” may be used of persons as well as the agreement. Context will make clear which use
we intend. Another oft-used English term, “guarantor,” has a legal meaning dissimilar from surety, so we
will not use it. See below, note 18.
12
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But this reading is not without its own difficulties. It undoes the apparent
parallelism of Prov 6:1: ʾim ʿārābtā lěrēʿekā tāqaʿtā lazzār kapekā. The two clauses, ʾim
ʿārābtā lěrēʿekā (if you gave surety for your neighbor) and tāqaʿtā lazzār kapekā (if you
struck your hand for a stranger), are nearly identical except that the conditional ʾim (if) is
not present in the second. The verbal forms are parallel in person, gender, and number;
Hebrew poetry commonly uses such constructions to express parallelism in meaning. It
requires no great stretch of the imagination to understand the verbs as differently voicing
the same action (especially given the poetic nature of the text). Indeed, Prov 6:2 uses a
form of parallelism to portray the consequences of going surety (being trapped).
Nonetheless, Fox’s reading suggests that the addressee (“my son”) has carried out
different actions towards the lender (reaʿ) and the stranger (zār). The subject “gives
surety” to the neighbor on behalf of the stranger, with whom he “strikes hands.”
The reading that assumes different identities for zār and reaʿ maintains the
parallelism between the prepositions but undoes the neat syntactic parallelism between
the verbs. The word following each verb is prefixed with the preposition lamed (lě and la
above). In both cases, it indicates the indirect object. The surety makes some sort of
promise to the lender. He executes a different act with or towards the borrower, namely
“striking hands.”13 A parallel reading requires fewer syntactic somersaults. It is also

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 212, writes, “Syntactically, ͑ārab governs the beneficiary of the surety as an
accusative. For example, ‘Your servant took responsibility for the lad [to my father]’ (Gen 44:32; Gen
43:9). In Ps 119:122, the Psalmist asks God to ‘take responsibility for’ or ‘vouch for’ him ‘for good’... The
item given as security can also appear as an accusative: Neh 5:3; Jer 30:21. The verb ͑ārab does not govern
zār in the present verse, though it does so in Prov 11:15 and 20:16 (= 27:13), which offer basically the
same advice. The precise locution ͑ārab + l-… does not occur elsewhere in a sense appropriate to the
present verse, but in 17:18 the neighbor’s role is unambiguous: ‘A senseless man strikes a bargain [lit.,
‘strikes the hand,’ as here], giving surety before a neighbor [lipnê].’ The preposition ‘before’ shows that the
neighbor is the recipient, not the beneficiary, of the guarantee. The guarantor takes responsibility for the
borrower’s loan in the presence of or to the latter.”
13

13
curious because there are other options for the prepositions; indeed, one of the other
surety proverbs employs another preposition. Prov 17:18 uses ʿrb + lipnê, indicating that
the subject is giving surety “in the presence of” their neighbor. Nevertheless, it is still
possible to read the first lamed of Prov 6:1 as indicating the direct object.
Bruce Waltke argues against this reading that differentiates the neighbor and the
stranger and suggests that they are the same person.14 He asserts on the basis of evidence
from the ancient versions that the first lamed is likely to indicate the accusative
construction and was introduced in Prov 6:1a to parallel 6:1b.15 The two lameds thus
have different nuances, for in the second case the lamed must indicate the indirect
object.16 He also suggests that it is counterintuitive that the lender would release the
guarantor, and even that it would be unethical for the guarantor to ask since he is now
legally obligated to the lender.

For Fox, the first lamed of Prov 6:1 is a lamed indicative of the indirect object. See Ronald J.
Williams, Williams’ Hebrew Syntax, ed. John C. Beckman (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007),
page 106, §269, §273b.
14

Waltke, Proverbs 1-15, 331.

Waltke, Proverbs 1-15, 325. He writes, “[Gemser, McKane, and Plöger] argue that the unique
construction must mean ‘with’ or ‘to’ your neighbor, not ‘for sake of,’ [sic] whether the one addressed has
contracted a loan for himself or has taken on the giving of security for the loan of another. They contend
that [Prov 6:3], ‘you have fallen into the hand of your neighbor,’ makes best sense if the neighbor is the
creditor. But the LXX, Targ., and Syr. understood [ʿrb lǝ] to mean, “to give security for the sake of.” In
Aramaic ‘for the sake of’ with [ʿrb] is expressed by lamed, and L. A. Snijders… notes that in Talmudic
Hebrew ʿrb [lǝ] means ‘to stand surety for.’ Thus, lamed in this construction presumably is on a par with
the [accusative] construction; it may have been occasioned by the lamed in verset B. Furthermore, [Prov
6:3] makes more sense if the neighbor is the debtor, not the creditor. One could scarcely expect the creditor
to forgive a loan, nor would the sage admonish the son to dun him out of his lawful due, but one might
expect the debtor to forgive the gullible surety.”
The LXX does read the lamed as indicating an accusative: ean enguēsē son philon, “if you have
guaranteed for your friend.”
15

16

“Hands” is the direct object.
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The readings of both Fox and Waltke rest on an assumption about the structure of
the surety agreement and lexical evidence, because the syntax allows for either reading of
the prepositions. It appears that if the assumption about the structure of the surety
agreement changes, the lexical evidence can be massaged to support either reading. But
given the limited information we have, it seems imprudent to rest too much on the
assumption that either the lender or the borrower is the only one who can release the
surety from their obligation. One must note that there is not really evidence either way in
the biblical text; both assumptions are informed by an intuition about the relationship of
the surety to the borrower and to the lender. The traditional reading (with Waltke and
most others) will be overturned if it is shown that only the lender can release the surety
from their obligation. If only the lender can release the surety, and if one still takes the
neighbor and stranger of Prov 6:1 as synonymous representations of the borrower, then
the necessary inference is that the neighbor to which Prov 6:2-5 refers is a different
neighbor—the lender. If, however, the evidence indicates that only the debtor could
release the surety from his obligation, then the reading that suggests different identities
for the neighbor and stranger would be overturned. At this point, we will not attempt to
fully settle the question of the identity of the borrower and lender in the text, but merely
note the two divergent readings.17
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We have presented two of the positions but there are others. Scott L. Harris, Proverbs 1-9: A
Study of Inner-Biblical Interpretation, SBLDS 150 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 134–142, suggests that
the neighbor and stranger are identical and that the text should be translated, “my son, if you have become
surety for your companion, and what’s more, if you have struck a bargain with a stranger” (140). For
Harris, the second clause intensifies the first but the neighbor and stranger are identical. Raymond Van
Leeuwen notes the confusion saying, “while the exact mechanisms and persons involved in financial
transactions described in Prov 6:1-5 are disputed, the wisdom issues are clearly and subtly treated.” See
NIB 5, 74. Van Leeuwen does not discuss which party is which. Duane Garrett notes that there are various
theories but suggests that the parallelism of 6:1 ought to be maintained. See Duane A. Garrett, Proverbs,
Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, NAC 14 (Nashville: Broadman, 1993), 96. Franz Delitzsch also make an
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A brief comment about the place of the surety proverbs in the book is in order. It
is noteworthy that this first mention of surety for debt falls within the first nine chapters
of Proverbs, a block usually taken separately by commentators.18 These introductory
chapters treat many of the most important subjects in the book and provide a lens through
which the reader sees the shorter sayings that follow. Among the significant subjects
addressed are fear of God, sexual fidelity, community life, and righteousness versus
wickedness—often couched in exhortations to the reader (“my son”) to seek wisdom
above all else! The appearance of an (extended) saying on surety for debt and its risks in
these early chapters is thus a sign that the subject is relatively important to the
compiler(s) of Proverbs.
The remainder of the sayings on surety for debt are much shorter and all appear
later in Proverbs.
The one who gives surety (ʿārab) for a stranger will suffer much harm, but the
one who hates striking [hands] (toqî ʿm) is safe.19

assumption about the surety and interprets Prov 6:1-5 on the basis of that assumption. He writes, “The
phrase [ʿrb + lamed] is not elsewhere met with, and is thus questionable. If we look to ver. 3, the
[neighbor] mentioned there cannot possibly be the creditor with whom one has become surety, for so
impetuous and urgent an application to him would be both purposeless and meaningless.” See Franz
Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Proverbs of Solomon, trans. M. G. Easton, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1950), 135-136.
18

E.g. Clifford, Proverbs, 1–3.

19
Prov 11:15. “Much harm” is an attempt to capture the cognate accusative raʿ yërô ʿa. Andreas
Scherer, “Is the Selfish Man Wise?: Considerations of Context in Proverbs 10.1-22.16 with Special Regard
to Surety, Bribery, and Friendship,” JSOT 76 (1997): 61–63, notes that Garrett was the first to recognize a
link between vv. 14 and 15, assigning these verses to “the pattern ‘imprudent action brings disaster/prudent
action gives security’… Hence the statement of Prov. 11.15 is qualified by its nearest context in two
different but still complementary ways. First, if v. 14 is consulted, the interpretation of v. 15 is focused on
the foolishness of the guarantor who carelessly risks his own existence. As a nation is brought to ruin for
lack of guidance (v. 14a), a guarantor will suffer damage in his personal life. Thus, offering surety turns out
to be the result of a lack of forethought and reason.” As will become evident from a discussion of
interpretations of this proverb and others on surety for debt, the way in which Scherer makes use of the
context to arrive at the point of the proverb results in one of the most cogent readings of a proverb on surety
for debt but leaves the basic features of surety unexplained.
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A man who lacks sense [lit. “heart”] is one who strikes (tô qēaʿ) a hand; he is one
who gives a surety (ʿō rēb ʿǎrubâ) before his companion.20
Take his garment if he gives surety (ʿārab) for a foreigner, keep it as a pledge
(ḥablēhû) if for a foreign woman.21
Do not be as one who strikes hands (bětō qǝʿê kāp) or as one who gives surety for
debts (baʿō rǝbî m); if you do not have the means to pay, your bed will be taken
from beneath you.22
More preliminary observations are in order.
Proverbs has a markedly negative view of giving surety for debt, especially on
behalf of a stranger or foreigner (usually a zār). The sayings liken the situation of persons
who do enter into such arrangements to that of a hunted animal; the person ought to
forego sleep until they have escaped the closing trap. The act of giving surety is virtually
certain to bring harm. It is foolish. Extra measures should be taken to protect oneself
from persons who do give sureties in uncertain situations. The consequences of giving
surety can be startling—one’s bed may be taken while one is lying upon it!
The paucity of detail is also worth noting. Danger is associated with giving surety
on behalf of a stranger or foreigner, but it is equally present in the situation where both
the borrower and surety are unspecified. While the verb “to strike hands” is used to
indicate how, in some cases, the surety sealed his obligation, the way in which the surety
itself works is largely unspecified—is some specific item deposited or promised? An

Prov 17:18; Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 212, writes “the preposition ‘before’ shows that the neighbor is
the recipient, not the beneficiary of the guarantee. The guarantor takes responsibility for the borrower’s
loan in the presence of or to the latter.”
20

21

Prov 20:16; Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 211.

22
Prov 22:26. The verbal adjectives are substantives and the jussive “do not be” stands at the
beginning of the clause. Murphy, Proverbs, 171, writes that “the ‘bed’ is a sign of luxury that not all
enjoyed.” If this is the case, then the saying is directed to the (relatively) wealthy. Furniture also served as
security for debts in other ancient Near Eastern contexts. See Karen Radner, “Neo-Assyrian Period,” in A
History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. Westbrook, Raymond, HdO 72:1 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 905.
The preposition bet is a bet of identity (“as”). See Williams, Williams’ Hebrew Syntax, §249.
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exception is Prov 20:16 // 27:13, but here the vocabulary is different. The held garment is
a ḥǎbō l (as elsewhere in the Old Testament, see below). Otherwise, we can ascertain very
little from Proverbs about how the surety worked.
The Semantic Domains of Security for Debt
The major claim of this thesis is that ancient Near Eastern records elucidate the proverbs
mentioned above, especially given the interpretive confusion that surrounds them.
However, it would be foolish to attempt a comparison with the extra-biblical texts
without conducting a detailed examination of the way in which Biblical Hebrew
expresses security for debt in general and the particular sort of security (surety) to which
the proverbs refer. In this section, we will examine more closely some of the key terms as
they occur throughout the Old Testament in order to ascertain whether the interpretive
difficulties can be overcome on these grounds alone. We will find that this is not so;
despite the clarifying results of inner-biblical comparison, some difficulties persist.
A comment about terminology is now necessary. English and biblical Hebrew
both employ different language to talk about different kinds of security for debt. In
English, a “pledge” is security provided by the primary borrower and is usually some
kind of real property. “Surety” always means security provided by a third party. We will,
in short order, associate some Hebrew words with these English approximations; because
the following discussion makes use of this distinction we have made it explicit here in
order to assist the reader.
ʿrb: Verbal and Non-verbal Forms
While the root ʿrb has the basic meaning “to enter,” in contexts of security for debt it may
refer to one of two things: 1) the provision of a pledge by the primary borrower, or 2)

18
third-party security for a debt (surety).23 There are three non-verbal occurrences of ʿrb (as
the noun ʿērābô n) in Genesis 38, where Judah gives to Tamar his signet ring, cord, and
staff (Gen 38:17, 18, 20). Tamar keeps these in lieu of payment—given this context, it is
clear that ʿērābô n means “a possessory pledge.” The non-verbal meaning of ʿrb is
different than its meaning when it appears as a verb. The verbal form denotes surety.
The verbal form of ʿrb appears in other settings carrying a nuance of surety or
some other promise. On at least two occasions, God is the requested surety or backer. Job
17:3 reads “give my surety (ʿārǝbēnî ) with you; who else will strike (yittāqēaʿ) himself
[in]to my hand?” A similar plea occurs in Ps 119:122, when the Psalmist says, “guarantee
(ʿǎrō b) good for your servant.” The verbal form also occurs in Isa 38:14b, where it is an
imperative (ʿārǝbēnî ): “I am distressed, give surety for me.” Jer 30:21 preserves a unique
occurrence of ʿārab with the subject’s very self as the object: “who will give/promise
(ʿārab) himself to serve me?” Finally, in the Joseph cycle, ʿrb is used to indicate Judah’s

“Pledge” and “surety” are technical English legal terms that are our closest approximation to the
biblical terms. Pledge may be used verbally or non-verbally. Thus, “to pledge” means to provide
“something as a security for a debt or obligation.” Pledges are one of three kinds: hypothecary, possessory,
or antichretic. A hypothecary pledge is promised from the outset of the loan or obligation and seized by the
lender only in the event of a default. A possessory pledge is, rather obviously, one in which the lender takes
possession of the item pledged immediately upon the outset of the loan or obligation. An antichretic pledge
is one in which the proceeds from some property (for example, a field, vineyard, or estate), are paid to the
lender in lieu of payment of the principal.
Unlike pledges, “surety” always refers to a third party that secures the loan. Surety differs from
“guarantee” (another technical English legal term) in that sureties are given at the outset of an obligation
and guarantees are provided sometime after the outset of the loan or obligation. A guarantor may not
always have access to the same information as does a surety and may have different rights and obligations.
The secondary literature (at least biblical commentaries) often equivocates between surety and guarantor.
Even though the obligations and legal structures of the surety and the guarantor differ, we too will not
usually distinguish between them in this thesis (for stylistic purposes and because they are not distinct in
the biblical text). Unless otherwise noted, we use “surety” and “guarantor” for the third party who secures a
loan or obligation. “Pledge,” however, will always mean security provided by the primary borrower.
23
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assurance of Benjamin safety. Judah promises Benjamin’s safe return to their father (Gen
43:9; 44:52).
In at least the case of the Joseph cycle, the verbal form must be taken as meaning
a third-party security. In that case, a debt is not the obligation secured. Rather, Benjamin
is protected from some other threat by Judah’s promise that he will return; in the case that
he is not, Judah will take full responsibility (Gen 43:8-9). In the other cases the meaning
is more difficult to determine, but have mostly to do with the protection or restoration of
the one on behalf of whom the surety is given. A debt is not necessarily involved—rather,
the health or freedom (from death, illness, etc.) of the beneficiary may be at risk. In only
one case (Jer 30:21), the verbal form indicates a pledge or promise rather than third-party
security.24
Pledges as Security for Debt
The other biblical texts that deal with security for debt are not concerned with surety but
with pledges of various sorts. A number of texts mention possessory or hypothecary

24

See Gerald L. Keown, Pamela J. Scalise, and Thomas G. Smothers, Jeremiah 26-52, WBC 27
(Waco, TX: Word, 1995), 104, where they write, “the rhetorical question in v 21c serves as a reminder of
the grave danger to any human who would initiate or presume this approach to God. The expression
“pledge the heart” is unique. In Neh 5:3 people give fields, houses, and vineyards in pledge in order to get
the grain they need. Here not property but life itself is put at risk. The לב, ‘heart,’ can stand for the person
as a whole, as in Ps 22:26…”
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pledges.25 Other texts seem to allude to an antichretic pledge.26 These texts
overwhelmingly use the word ḥǎbō l to mean “pledge.” In Prov 20:16, the sage advises
that the one should take an additional pledge from the surety in certain cases. This is the
only biblical case wherein a surety is secured with an additional possessory pledge. The
unique case indicates the relative risk of the arrangement in Prov 20:16.
The texts on pledges for debt are helpful in that they elucidate Prov 20:16, but
they are not helpful with respect to the other proverbs on surety for debt. We are left in
essentially the same place we started. The proverbs, it seems, must be taken to denote
surety. Can any more be said about the language that we find in them?
ʿrb and tqʿ: Parallel or Distinct Actions?
One of the major questions in the interpretation of the proverbs on surety for debt hinges
upon whether ʿrb and tqʿ are parallel acts or whether they signify two distinct actions. In
the case that ʿrb and tqʿ are parallel, we must construe—in manner consisted with such
parallel meaning—the actions that the lender, borrower, and surety carry out towards one
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Ex 22:26-27; Dt 24:6, Dt 24:7; Job 22:6; 24:3, Eze 18:7, 12, 16; Am 2:8. The Hebrew term is
ḥbl. This is the same word used in Prov 20:16 and 27:13. 2 Kgs 4:1-7 (the story of Elisha and the widow’s
oil) may be an allusion to the institution of pledge. The widow cannot pay a debt and the lender is ready to
collect something else in lieu of payment—the widow’s two young sons! While the narrative withholds any
indication of whether the deceased man had pledged his children as collateral for the debt, this seems
entirely plausible (given that persons could be collateral for debt). Whether or not this is the case is entirely
superfluous for understanding the narrative (the drama is centered on the widow’s crisis and this crisis is
sufficiently developed as it is); however, one should be aware at least of the possibility of a contractual
obligation lurking in the background.
Neh 5:3 says “some were saying, ‘we are pledging (ʿō rǝbêm) our fields, our vineyards, and our
houses to get grain during the famine.’” This should not be confused with the statement in Neh 5:5 that
“our fields and vineyards now belong to others,” so that the earlier verse is taken to mean that the
fields/vineyards/houses were actually sold. The text clearly indicates that a different compound subject is
speaking in Neh 5:3 and 5:4-5. It is possible to take Neh 5:3 as referring to an antichretic pledge; while this
is not certain, it is unlikely to be an outright sale (as in the NIV).
26
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another. If, however, ʿrb and tqʿ are not parallel, then the identities of the parties and their
various relationships are rather different.
Here again, the internal evidence is not very much help. The only other case in
which the two verbal forms occur together outside Proverbs is in Job 17:3. In that case,
they do seem to be parallel. This is not very much help in Proverbs, because even though
the “neighbor” and “stranger” of Prov 6:1 seem to stand in parallel construction, they do
not necessarily need to be. The lamed prefixed to both forms may indicate either the
direct object (in which case the neighbor is the borrower) or the indirect object (in which
case the neighbor is the lender). The position that one takes depends on the reading of the
preposition.
tāqaʿ kap in Proverbs: Allusion to a Gesture?
We will discuss in chapter IV whether tāqaʿ kap (“to strike the hand”) indicates a gesture
or is only used as a parallel to ʿrb. At this early juncture, though, we wish to foreground
the other biblical evidence because it fits with this portion of the discussion and so that
the reader may bear it in mind throughout. The consensus of the commentaries is that
tāqaʿ kap alludes to a symbolic act that solemnized the surety agreement.27 In some
biblical texts, it is quite clear that the phrase does indicate a gesture of some sort. The
gesture is exclamatory and denotes exultation with regards to either: a) pleasure over the
fall of Assyria, or b) joy that God is king.28 The gestural meaning is certainly one
possibility for the phrase.
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E.g., TDOT 15, 765-769; NIB 5, 118.
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Nah 3:19; Ps 47:2.
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However, there are other possible meanings, not least because kap (hands) is not
always used to indicate the body part. It may also indicate power, safekeeping, and so
forth. If the “hands” in Prov 6:1 are figurative, then the verb cannot indicate a gesture.
Indeed, “hands” has such a figurative meaning in Prov 6:3 (“you have come into the hand
of your neighbor”). We will delay the remainder of this discussion until after we address
the ancient Near Eastern sources because they bear on our reading of Proverbs. It is safe
to say at this juncture, though, that tāqaʿ kap does occur in parallel with ‘rb and is either
nearly equivalent in meaning or denotes a gesture that may have been used for
security arrangements.
Interpretation of the Proverbs on Surety for Debt
Historical commentary on the proverbs on surety for debt is quite sparse, so we will focus
on more recent interpretations, beginning with book-length commentaries before
proceeding to topical works.29
Leo Perdue most concisely addresses the biblical evidence.30 For Perdue, surety is
a subset of pledge—in Prov 6:1-5 the surety is the result of a “hasty promise” (he gives
no reason why we ought to infer hastiness). While he writes that the particular pledge in

29
For early Christian commentary, see Tremper Longman III, ed., Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of
Solomon, ACCS 9 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005). Early Jewish commentary makes the
proverbs an allegory of God’s relationship to Israel. See Visotzky, The Midrash on Proverbs, 36–38. I have
not consulted Rashi’s commentary, but for a recent version see Lisa Fredman, “Rashi’s Commentary on the
Book of Proverbs: A Critical Edition and an Analysis of Rashi’s Exegetical Method” (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan
University, 2010). See Esperanza Alfonso, “In between Cultures: An Anonymous Commentary on the
Book of Proverbs from Thirteenth-Century Iberia,” JJS 64 (2013): 119–56 for the Hebrew text of another
commentary. For early modern commentary, see David Durell, Critical Remarks on the Books of Job,
Proverbs, Psalms, Ecclesiastes, and Canticles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1772), 209, and Robert Lawson,
Exposition of the Book of Proverbs, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: printed for David Brown, 1821), 109–111. These
historical commentaries bear very little on the questions we raise in this thesis.
30

Perdue, Proverbs, IBC (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2000), 124.
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view here is one in which the person promises himself or herself as surety, he also cites
biblical evidence to suggest (confusedly) that either a person or property may be surety,
and states that “the act of making a pledge [of surety] involved both the giving of the
hand [handshake?] and a verbal declaration. A pledge may have been a public act to
reinforce [the surety’s] authenticity and legality.”31 Perdue also observes the multiple
references in Proverbs to surety for debt and the negative attitude of the book towards
entering such agreements. In subsequent discussions, he also refers to the potential loss—
but again, it is unclear what this loss might be.32
It is worth noting the tentative nature of Perdue’s discussion and the questions
that persist after it. He asserts that some gesture (perhaps a handshake) is involved and
that pledging surety may have been a public act. But this is tentative, because there is no
evidence in Proverbs for the publicity of the act. He also notes the high perceived danger
of such involvement—but why “disaster” might be the result of providing such surety is
also unclear. Why, in the case of the proverbs on surety for debt, is it certain that the
person is offering themselves as security and not some other asset?33 What does it mean
for a person to become the surety as opposed to providing property? And, if the person is
security, why is one of the perceived consequences the confiscation of their furniture?34
Michael Fox has also commented at length on Prov 6:1-5 and the other sayings on
surety for debt. Fox does not define whether the surety is the person or their property. He
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Perdue, Proverbs, 124.
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Perdue, Proverbs, 182.
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Perdue, Proverbs, 125.
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Perdue, Proverbs, 124.
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does not make any suggestion as to what kind of loan the addressee is securing, but does
have an oblique reference to commercial terminology.35 The agreement is verbal and
sealed with a gesture.36 The danger into which the surety falls is defined only as a change
in the balance of power—but this amounts to not much more than a repetition of the
Hebrew text when it states that the surety has come into the power (lit. “come into the
hand”) of his neighbor.37 Alternatively, the danger may just be that the borrower is
unknown to the surety, and that they will “go away and leave the surety stuck with the
debt.”38 Or, in the case of Prov 20:16, the danger of giving surety is that the surety’s
property is at risk.39 Interestingly, Fox attempts to parse out the motive that one might
have for providing surety—he states that it is remunerative, that is, that the surety
provides surety to receive a fee from the borrower.40 His final comments on Prov 6:1-5
are worth quoting
While various proverbs offer prudential advice about giving surety, [Prov 6:1-5]
seems to push the concern to an extreme and to display a high anxiety about its
dangers. Perhaps the heightened uneasiness reflects a growth in the frequency of
money lending in an increasingly commercial society and a corresponding
temptation to exploit such transactions for a quick gain… The point of [Prov 6:1-

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 213, writes “the idiom [to strike hands] is not used outside Wisdom
literature, but that may be due to a the [sic] overall paucity of commercial terminology in the Bible. In our
sources [to strike hands] always refers to going surety, though the gesture probably had a broader
implication of friendship or accord. The same gesture is called “hand to hand” in Prov 11:21; 16:5, where it
signifies assurance or personal commitment by the speaker.
35

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 213, says also “the author takes it for granted that such an agreement locks
one in as effectively as a written document.”
36
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Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 213.
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Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10-31: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB
18B (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 633.
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Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 669.
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Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 215.
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5] is, rather [than providing advice on how to extract oneself], to paint the
consequences of going surety in such dire and demeaning terms that the reader
will beware of stepping into the trap.41
Fox, then, reads a commercial background for this saying and others, but does not offer
much to readers that will convince them that this need be so.42
Roland Murphy’s work on Prov 6:1-5 is noteworthy for his comments on laws
governing surety and the reason for their absence. He notes that while there are laws in
the Old Testament concerned with pledges, none are attested that govern sureties; it is
possible that “later social conditions… rendered the practice necessary, and also
precarious.”43 No evidence is cited to support this claim. The manner in which a surety
agreement came about is not clear, and neither is the type of loan, although Murphy
seems to be suggesting that the surety would have been given on behalf of some needy
person: “the one who goes surety will pay the debt… of the needy one.”44 That Murphy
views lending as primarily a safety net for the poor is more evident in his later comment
on Prov 22:26-27 that, “it would seem that this form of social aid [the hand pledge]
created more problems than it solved.”45 Besides this, Murphy has nothing to say about
the consequences of surety. The marked contrast with Fox’s commercial background for
lending and surety should be noted.
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Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 216.
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Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 536.
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Murphy, Proverbs, 37.
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The proverbs and other texts on surety for debt have also occasionally been
addressed in scholarly publications. One of the best works is Tikva Frymer-Kensky’s
chapter, “Israel,” in the edited volume Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law.46
Frymer-Kensky notes that surety for debt “is not mentioned in the laws, but can be
inferred from Proverbs which advise people not to stand surety for a non-family
member.”47 She also suggests that Gen 44 is likely an instance of surety in a narrative
setting; she asserts that “[Judah] offers to stay with Joseph so that Benjamin can go home.
In this case Judah would not be a pledge or security—he is offering to be taken in slavery
instead of Benjamin.”48 Frymer-Kensky’s reading is correct; Judah’s obligation leads him
to take Benjamin’s place. Judah is not, at the outset, the surety for some debt or
obligation of Benjamin. This, then, is a slightly different use of ʿārab in which the subject
ensures that some other party will fulfill a particular task or role. Frymer-Kensky also
states that loans in Israel were charitable in nature.
Timothy Sandoval’s The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the Book of
Proverbs sets the sayings on surety for debt in the framework of the larger economic
back-and-forth within Proverbs. Sandoval follows Fox in suggesting that the motive for
giving surety may be profit, but he also acknowledges that one might enter a surety
agreement with more charitable motives.49 Sandoval helpfully compares the sayings in
Proverbs with other ancient Near Eastern wisdom literature, concluding that the overall
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Frymer-Kensky, “Israel,” 256.
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Sandoval, Discourse of Wealth and Poverty, 108, 111.
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stance of the wisdom literature is negative towards entering surety agreements, especially
given the financial risks.50 In fact, the type of surety that Proverbs has in view is
especially risky given that it is offered on behalf of the stranger, who will more easily
disappear.51 He also draws out the parallel between the “stranger” (zār) and the “strange
woman” (zārāh) of Prov 5; in keeping with his project to access the ethical focus of
Proverbs on wealth and poverty, he concludes that “for Proverbs, to stand surety for a
stranger, quite simply, but also symbolically, is to travel the ‘adulterous’ path of folly.”52
Sandoval’s treatment of the practice of surety is thin. He leaves open the
possibility that surety was provided with charitable or commercial motives, but does not
nail down whether Proverbs has in view charitable loans or others. He also does not
discuss the parallelism between giving surety (ʿrb) and striking hands (tqʿ); are these
component parts of the process of giving surety, or are they distinct?
We began this chapter by pointing out five problems in commentary on proverbs
taking surety as their subject. Now, we have introduced the reader to those proverbs and
illustrated, with summary and quotations from scholars, the state of our knowledge about
them. The five difficulties we pointed out were: 1) differences of opinion about the role
and motivation of the surety, 2) confusion about the mechanism of the surety (what and
how the surety takes on liability), 3) the questionable assumption that surety was
implemented gesturally rather than in some other way, 4) and the legal structure of the
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surety agreement (who held legal power over whom, and how could those obligated be
released), and 5) other ancient Near Eastern records on surety are rarely discussed as
clarifying evidence.
In short, the interpretation of the proverbs on surety for debt proceeds in an
environment where there is a limited amount of helpful biblical data and our knowledge
is somewhat stunted by this reality. This brings about a situation in which presuppositions
about the charitable or profit-seeking motive of the surety—as well as the structure of the
legal agreements between the lender, debtor, and surety—leads the discussion of the
textual evidence. There remains doubt about the word-pair tāqaʿ + kap and its meaning in
the context of our proverbs; prima facie, it seems to be a gesture that enacted a surety
agreement but this is not certain. Finally, the whole discussion is proceeding in a manner
that is isolated from other evidence that may prove clarifying—ancient Near Eastern
lending records and scholarship on those records. These records, what scholars have said
about them, and an exploration of their comparative value for our proverbs are together
the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO
ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN RECORDS IN SUMMARY AND THEIR VALUE FOR
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Scholarship on lending in the ancient Near East has been robust. While there are few
works that address surety directly, a number of publications show interest in the subject.
The fragmented character of the secondary literature is one of the frustrating barriers to a
comparative study; thus, this chapter will survey only the works most relevant for our
study. We will also summarize the ancient Near Eastern records: what we have, from
where, and when the records originated. This discussion will allow us to anticipate some
of the problems we will encounter in comparing these records to the proverbs and to
outline a fitting comparative methodology. We will argue that one may employ two
methods (contextual and historical) for comparing the biblical and ancient Near Eastern
texts, but suggesting that a contextual method that uses the ancient Near Eastern evidence
as a heuristic is methodologically sound.
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the ancient Near Eastern records to the
reader and to establish a method under which they are helpful to the study of Proverbs.
The three important claims for which we will present supporting evidence in this chapter
are: a) the evidential base (both primary and secondary sources) is sufficiently robust so
as to support a comparative study, b) this makes the near-absence of reference to these
sources in scholarship and commentary on Proverbs all the more puzzling, and c) a
productive comparative study need not necessarily prove a direct historical stream of
influence between the proverbs on surety for debt and the other ancient Near Eastern
29
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sources (although this seems possible). None of these claims should be confused with the
main point we are trying to make (the ancient Near Eastern evidence elucidates the
proverbs), but understood instead as ancillary: necessary but still secondary.
Ancient Near Eastern Records: An Outline
Ancient Near Eastern lending documents fit basically into two categories: contracts and
legal proceedings. The contracts are by far the most numerous and may be further divided
into two categories: loan agreements themselves (documents that record the enactment of
a loan), and something like debt-notes (which simply record an obligation of one party to
another). For the time being, we will discuss these together, but it is important to
remember that loan agreements and debt-notes are not identical.1 After contracts, legal
proceedings are the best source for the study of surety—but they are far less numerous.
While there may be laws that bear on the institutions of surety, they are sufficiently
obscure that we have not discovered any. Our purpose in this section is to demonstrate
the fairly wide availability of data on surety in the ancient Near East by sampling from
the periods in which the documents are attested; we will not provide a discussion of all of
the records. Other findings of the secondary literature will be noted as is fitting.
Contracts
Contracts with surety agreements are attested from the Sargonic period (c. 2300
BCE) until at least 424 BCE.2 There are thousands of these loan contracts available in the

1
The loan agreement were recorded at the onset of the obligation, but debt-notes may reflect the
institution of a surety sometime after the onset of the obligation.

Grant Frame, “A Neo-Babylonian Tablet with an Aramaic Docket and the Surety Phrase pūt
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Old Babylonian Period.3 On Old Assyrian records, Klaas Veenhof notes that many debtnotes must have been produced, and then continues to say
Most are lost, however, because the debtor upon [payment] received “his tablet”
(recording his liability and sealed by him) back, which was regularly destroyed
(‘killed’; the sealed envelope was broken and the tablet thrown away). Thus, the
number of surviving debt-notes, which includes duplicates and copies of original
contacts, is comparatively small. It must have included unpaid, bad debts, for
which security is more likely to be required.4
Veenhof seems to mean that unpaid or bad debts were more likely to be preserved (since
they went unpaid and the tablets would not have been destroyed). If his assumption
stands—namely, that unpaid and bad debts were more likely to require security—then the
data in which we are interested is more likely to have been accidentally preserved.
Veenhof is aware of around 250 debt-notes (published and unpublished).5 These attest to
the use of both pledges and guarantors; various precious metals and persons serve as
pledges, and guarantors are named.6 The terminology used for sureties in the loan
contracts varies, and Veenhof has an extensive discussion of this terminology, including
the syntax of surety agreements and the inflection of the related verbs.7 Around ten

Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 112; Skaist, The Old Babylonian Loan Contract, 11; Claus Wilcke,
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percent of the loans mention a guarantor, and Veenhof concludes that this means “only a
limited number of loans were secured by guarantors right from the beginning.”8
Some of the contracts attested were clearly commercial loans. Veenhof mentions
quantities of silver ranging from 30 minas (which he estimates at 15 kilograms or ±30
pounds) up to 46 kilograms (±100 pounds).9 Very few of these large loans mention a
guarantor, however—Veenhof attributes this to “the fact that in general such commercial
transactions went fairly smoothly and profits were substantial enough such that debtors
could pay back what they owed.”10 Nevertheless, sureties are attested for loans large
and small.
There are around “one hundred private loan documents” from the Middle
Assyrian period, in addition to official loans of various sorts.11 Kathleen Abraham
distinguishes between these and “promissory notes,” which may be distinguished on the
basis of their constituent elements.12 While pledges are well attested, guarantors are not
(or are not attested with much certainty).13 As a result, we will de-emphasize this period.
There is a “rich corpus” of loan contracts from Nuzi.14 Carlo Zaccagnini is able to
cite a considerable number of studies and state with confidence that
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The basic features of this type of legal transaction [security] have been
ascertained. Individual or multiple loans, with or without interest, could be
secured by one or more sureties, i.e. persons who guaranteed fulfillment of the
debtor’s obligation in its entirety. Movables or real estate are not attested as
security in ḫubullu-contracts; on the other hand, they occur in another type of
Nuzi contract (the tuppi
tidennūti) which, at least on a formulaic level, is
̣
patterned on the scheme of antichretic arrangements.15
There are a number of variations on this basic loan agreement at Nuzi, but by
Zaccagnini’s analysis seems to indicate that sureties occur mostly in the ḫubullucontracts.16
In the Neo-Assyrian period, the distinction we made above between a document
that records the enactment of a loan (loan agreement) and a document that merely records
the obligation (a debt-note) becomes important. In her study of the period, Karen Radner
chooses to use the term “obligation documents” (or Obligationsurkunden) to describe the
primary source of evidence.17 These are not contracts as such, but merely documents
recording the obligation of one party to another. Among these, Radner cites nearly
seventy cases of suretyship.18 The language in these documents is similar to that used in
the Old Assyrian period—the surety is a bēl qātāte. These surety formulas will be
explored in more detail below (chaper 4), but for now we should just note that there are
many cases of a surety.
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Very close to the same period, Aramaic loan contracts also attest to the use of
sureties. Edward Lipínski is able to adduce three of these, and Grant Frame mentions
twenty-five more for a total of twenty-eight contracts that have a surety agreement.19
Among these Aramaic contracts, three include the surety phrase mḥʾ yd or mḥʾ b-yd,
which Lipínski says are cognate to the Hebrew tāqaʿ kāp in Proverbs and Job and
roughly equivalent to the Neo-Assyrian qātāti maḫas ̣u; these contracts date from the
seventh century BCE.20 The contracts mentioned by Frame have a different surety phrase:
pūt šēp(i) našû (lit. “to assume guarantee for the foot”).21
Court Proceedings
As far as we have discovered, there are no laws from the ancient Near East that address
surety as such.22 There are, however, records of court proceedings or summons that
preserve events that occurred in the default of the debtor or her refusal to pay. These
records have been used as a source to discuss surety in the ancient Near East at least since
an article by Raymond Dougherty entitled “The Babylonian Principle of Suretyship as
Administered by Temple Law.”23 A number of the cases surveyed by Dougherty include
a surety agreement.
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Veenhof categorizes the judicial proceedings as being one of two kinds: 1) courtly
“contracts” between the surety and the lender in which the surety agrees to pay, and 2)
“depositions” which record statements of the creditor and/or debtor, to be heard by a
court.24 Similar court records appear to show that there were some protections for the
guarantor, since acting in this capacity could be risky business.25
The Records in Summary
At this stage, we should note the distribution of records on surety for debt. They are
widely distributed historically and geographically. Historically, there are records of
surety from the third millennium BCE right up into the 400’s BCE. We thus have
evidence available from a span of nearly two millenia.26 Geographically, there is also a
wide distribution, from lower Mesopotamia to central Anatolia, and as far south along the
Mediterranean coast as Ugarit.27 The documents are attested in a number of languages
and dialects, as might be expected given the large geographical and historical
distribution, and number over one hundred if we take only the counts of Radner, Frame,
and Lipínski into consideration. There are many more.
Records of surety for debt are, thus, attested throughout the ancient Near East, but
it is important to note at this stage two problematic features of the way in which they are
attested. The first is that we cannot be sure the records are representative of surety and
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the way(s) in which it was instituted. This is partly due to the destruction of records upon
the payment of a debt. It is also partly due to the accidental nature of archaeology (and to
looting, black market antiquity sales, and so forth). It is not even always possible to know
where a particular tablet originated.28 The second problem is that the records are
primarily agreements between two private parties—they reflect practices that differ by
time and place. No one record is exemplary of a normative legal practice.
These two problematic features of the data raise important questions about the
feasibility of a comparative study. If the records are not representative and not normative,
in what way can they be compared to biblical texts on surety (or vice versa)? Can one
know anything about surety in the ancient Near East besides that it seems to have been
executed in a particular manner in a particular time and place? Or, can one know
anything besides that surety was recorded a particular way in a particular time and place?
We will return to these questions in the final section of this chapter. In the
interim, we will further consider the secondary literature.
Scholarship on Surety and Lending in the Ancient Near East
Research on surety in the ancient Near East is almost always carried out as a subset of
some other discipline, especially legal or economic history. We will discuss legal history
first, since this field exhibits the most robust discussion. Economic history and other
topical works also discuss surety arrangements—we will note only the most basic
features of these discussions at the conclusion of this section.
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Legal History
The reader may still find it curious that we have selected the heading “legal history” for
our discussion, given that we have not discussed and will not discuss laws. There are two
reason for this. First, the scholarly discussion takes place in the field of legal history.
Second, the ancient Near Eastern texts are reflective of legal practice in one way or
another. They reflect situations in which one or more parties were obligated to one
another in such way that when those obligations were broken the dispute could be
resolved by the intervention of a court. This would be true even if the institution of surety
was regulated only under some kind of common law that was not codified.
The same is true of the proverbs on surety for debt. Like the contracts, the
proverbs are not practices themselves but must be understood first as a written reflection
of an economic practice if they are to have any meaning. They, too, reflect legal
relationships between parties. Even though there are no laws governing surety in the Old
Testament, one cannot say that surety was not perceived as a legal institution. Given that
there are laws on pledges and other debts, it is probable that there existed some commonlaw practice governed surety for debt. As with the ancient Near Eastern records, it is
fitting to attempt to understand the proverbs in terms of the legal relationships between
parties. Indeed, the commentaries reflect such an impulse even if they do not state it.
The following discussion of legal history will take place in two parts and on two
corresponding levels. In the first part, we will consult some works on the legal history of
the ancient Near East. This discussion will take place at a survey altitude. In the second
part of the discussion, we will consult a single work by Meir Malul that analyzes
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suretyship in the context of “ceremonial symbolism.”29 Malul raises important questions
about the distinction between the language recorded in the ancient Near Eastern records
and the way in which this language may or may not reflect symbolic acts (e.g., “striking
hands”). We discuss his work in more detail to become familiar with categories and
distinctions that will help our discussion in the next chapter.
Surety in Legal History
One of the best legal histories of the period in which we are interested is Raymond
Westbrook’s A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law.30 However, Westbrook also edited
with Richard Jasnow the volume Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law, which
is even more relevant to the subject at hand; although this volume is somewhat earlier
than A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, it is more extensive and detailed on
surety.31 We will briefly consider one of the more salient features of surety as it is
discussed by Westbrook and other contributors to both volumes.
In his chapter on the Old Babylonian Period, Westbrook distinguishes between
two kinds of surety.32 In the first type, Gestellungsbürgschaft, the surety guarantees the
appearance or presence of a person (the defendant in various legal contexts, debtor,
runaway slaves, etc.); Gestellungsbürgschaft was used in cases where there was a risk of
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flight.33 In the second type of surety agreement, the surety is obligated to pay the debt in
the case of a default by the borrower, but does not have a responsibility for ensuring the
borrower’s presence.34 Numerous terms are used to indicate a surety depending upon
whether the surety was enacted when the loan was made or after it was made.35
Klaas Veenhof discusses the parallel responsibilities of the guarantor to the lender
in texts from Anatolia. The guarantor is recorded, often by name; the guarantor would
also seal the tablet, “as is shown by the presence of his seal impression on a few debt
notes still encased in envelopes.”36 The guarantor’s obligations are not stated explicitly
(as in the proverbs), but are assumed; they may be deduced from “judicial records and
letters which show the guarantor had basically two obligations.”37 These two obligations
were: a) Gestellungsbürgschaft, ensuring that the creditor could collect from the debtor,
and b) to pay in the case that the debtor did not.38 While it cannot be concluded from the
evidence that every surety or guarantor had the obligation of Gestellungsbürgschaft, “it is

Gestellungsbürgschaft = Bürgschaft (security, surety, pledge) + Gestellung (muster, making
available); see Collins’ German Dictionary, unabridged 8th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 2013), 1234,
1426. Raymond Westbrook, “Slave and Master in Ancient Near Eastern Law,” Chicago-Kent Law Review
70 (1995), 1657, quotes Mark Van De Mieroop, “The Archive of Balmunamhe,” AfO 34 (1987): 1–29, who
cites cases of flight risk, “a number of transactions involving debt-slaves contained clauses making sureties,
sometimes identified as the slave’s relatives, liable to pay compensation to [personal name of the owner] if
the slave [sought release].” The surety would compensate the owner in the case that the slave was released
by a government official or other person in authority.
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clear that paying for the defaulting debtor was a general liability.”39 Both are attested in
ancient Near Eastern records.40
These two examples suffice to demonstrate that surety was not just a matter of
paying in the event of a default. Rather, two different obligations may have been
incumbent upon the surety. The surety might have carried the obligation to ensure the
presence of the borrower, in addition to paying in the event of a default. In chapter IV, we
will examine cases in which the surety had the responsibility of a straight payment to the
lender and cases in which he had a responsibility for the appearance of the borrower.
Meir Malul on Surety in Ancient Mesopotamia
Meir Malul’s Studies in Mesopotamian Legal Symbolism is an analysis of symbolic
ceremonial acts in the ancient Near East, with particular attention to how those acts may
have formalized, finalized, or otherwise changed legal rights and obligations.41 As we
saw in chapter I, exegetes of the proverbs on surety often read a symbolic act reflected in
those proverbs; using Malul’s categories and distinctions to analyze for symbolic acts
will help us to elucidate the proverbs.42 Although it may seem a detour, the method that
Malul uses to analyze surety will pay dividends both when we analyze the ancient Near
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Eastern texts and when we compare them to the biblical texts. We must begin by
summarizing the argument that precedes his analysis.
Malul asserts that examples of symbolic acts and of symbolism in legal systems
are written contracts with signatures. 43 Such contracts and signatures represent or
symbolize the obligations of one party to another, while the obligation itself remains
abstract (e.g., a contract to purchase a home is not identical to the obligation to purchase
the home). Other legal symbols and symbolic acts occur in court procedure (e.g., juries,
robes), and marriage ceremonies (e.g., joining hands, rings).44 Legal historians have
identified the presence of “symbolic ceremonialism” (execution and validation of a legal
contract with “various acts and formal ceremonies”) as an important part of contracts in
the historical legal systems. The enactment of a ceremony, in contrast to a spoken or
written word (or signature), finalized the contract.45
Malul suggests that legal relationships are progressively represented in a more
abstract manner; historically, legal relationships and obligations were perceived more
concretely than they are now. He writes,
Law, as with other aspects of life, could only be understood in concrete, real
terms. Thus such modern concepts as ownership were alien to the ancient mind
who perceived the relation between a man and his property in terms of possession
rather than ownership. The first term emphasizes the physical act of holding
something in one’s possession, the most direct expression of which was to lay
one’s hand on it, or in the case of land, to actually occupy it. Only one who
physically occupies a land or a house is said to “own” it. No wonder, symbolic
acts accompanying transfer of property or taking possession of it were based on
this principle of actual physical possession of the property. The tendency to
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render vivid legal relationships served… the purpose of conveying to the eyes and
other senses (hence the term “sensuous element”) the legal change that had
occurred. It had to be seen and heard in order to have any effect.46
Symbolic acts were inherently a part of legal systems and were substantially more
concrete than the legal symbols in use at present. These acts were necessarily public—
observable, and conducted in the presence of witnesses.47
Malul states that (at the time he set out to conduct his study) scholars had
addressed symbolic ceremonialism coherently (or at least adequately) in Germanic,
Roman, and Greek legal systems; the same was not true of ancient Near Eastern law.48 Of
previous studies, he concludes, “The notes and remarks [on specific symbolic acts] were
haphazard and unsystematic. The discussion and comments on specific symbolic acts
were usually secondary to the main theme of the study in question…”49 Malul also states
that later studies were “partial” or left unfinished, and that they
do not offer a comprehensive study of legal symbolism in Mesopotamian law, since
they lack a basic orientation toward elucidating the sensuous [Malul seems to mean
physio-symbolic] phenomenon in Mesopotamian law in general. A more serious
flaw in these studies is the lack of a clear and unified definition of the entity called
a “legal symbolic act. Scholars have proceeded upon the assumption that a certain
written remark in a document refers to some symbolic act performed by one or both
parties without justifying their identification of such remarks as symbolic acts.50
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The way that scholars could disagree about whether a particular record reflects the
historical enactment of a symbolic act becomes increasingly clear as Malul notes the
limitations of the source material, which are twofold.
1. The source material for a study of legal symbolism is primarily “private legal
documents” (this is essentially the same for the present study, see below, “Ancient
Near Eastern Records: An Outline”).51 There are not documents that are
normative for the practice of symbolic ceremonial acts.
2. Scholars do not have direct access to symbolic ceremonial actions. Because
symbolic ceremonial acts are enacted, the evidence is by definition secondary;
further, the documents may only record the result of an agreement—any narrative
context is excluded.52
Thus, scholarly discussion of the ceremony that enacts a legal arrangement is inhibited by
the limited and secondary set of data.
Malul asserts that it is also important to distinguish legal symbolic acts and the
documentary modes of speech that seem to bear witness to them. Legal speech seeming
to relate to symbolic acts exists in one of four modes:
1. Allusions to symbolic acts,
2. Allusions to non-symbolic acts,
3. Technical legal expressions, and
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4. Legal figures of speech (which are fixed to some degree).53
Confusion between these categories may lead to the misinterpretation of some technical
legal expression or figure of speech as an allusion to a symbolic act. Significantly, Malul
places a number of surety formulas squarely in the fourth category, “legal figures of
speech.” Legal figures of speech “express a legal result in figurative symbolic language,
but do not allude to any specific act [specifically those] performed on the head or the
forehead.”54 Depending on the outcomes of our planned analysis of other ancient Near
Eastern records, this may also bear on the interpretation of the proverbs by elucidating
the formula tqʿ kp.
Malul suggests the following definition for a symbolic act: “A symbolic act is an
act or gesture which must be performable and performed, is executed intentionally and
solemnly, in an appropriate context, for a limited span of time, and it must symbolize a
legal result which differs from its manifest physical result.”55 This definition and the
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Malul, Legal Symbolism, 17–20; at 20 he concludes with the remark that “it is evident that the
above four ‘modes of expression’ are of two kinds: those referring to some actual acts in real life (nos. 1
and 2), and those which can be called ‘rhetorical,’ in that they are communicative tools relegated to the
written or spoken level (nos. 3 and 4).”
54
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Malul, Legal Symbolism, 19.

Malul, Legal Symbolism, 20; cf. Malul, Legal Symbolism, 20-29, where these common-sense
criteria are further explored—we will now provide a punctual paraphrase of Malul’s exposition of them.
Specifically, symbolic acts are more than just gestures. Gestures function as a means of communication but
do not enact legal change, while symbolic acts are communicative and also enact a legal relationship. A
symbolic act must be such that it can be performed; some symbolic language is not performable (breaking
someone’s heart). And, even though something like “holding the head” is performable, it probably does not
reflect an actual symbolic act. Further, if one takes language as depicting the performance of the act, it must
be possible to understand the relationship of the verb to the noun quite literally. On page 23, Malul
provides the example of “seizing the father,” which is clearly not a performable symbolic act (contra other
classifications of it).
To help tell whether something might qualify as a symbolic act, one must also distinguish the
reality of symbolic acts from recorded legal terminology (as we have already mentioned). It is possible that
what began as a way of recording a particular symbolic act became, with time, stock legal terminology.
Therefore, even seemingly obvious remarks that portray a performable legal act may just be a technical
legal expression or legal figure of speech. Malul’s reference to the context of a symbolic act should also be
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criteria provided in it will inform our discussion of the various sorts of surety formulas
we will soon encounter (see below, especially chapter III).
It seems possible to analyze textual depictions of symbolic ceremonial acts on the
basis of morphology (the “form and structure of a symbolic act”), semantics (how does
the act differ from its result?), and etymology (“relationship between [the symbolism of
the] physical act… and its legal result”).56 It is not possible to analyze the four modes of
speech clustered around symbolic acts (allusions to symbolic acts, allusions to nonsymbolic acts, technical legal expressions, and legal figures of speech) on all of these
levels. Malul asserts that
Legal figures of speech are by definition without performance. They are confined
to the written or spoken level, and cannot be understood literally. Therefore, they
cannot be subjected to morphological analysis. They resemble symbolic acts in
that they have some derived meaning, and thus can be subjected to etymological
analysis.57
This particular point in Malul’s schema for interpreting legal figures of speech is difficult
to understand. He rules out analysis of the act by definition (figures of speech are not
performed), but seems to allow analysis of the difference between the figure of speech
and its performance (etymology)—this is incoherent and probably not what he means to
say. Perhaps, though, we can nuance his definition and say instead that a figure of speech
can be analyzed on the level of semantics (how does the recorded figure of speech differ
from its result), and on the level of etymology (why does the particular figure of speech

noted. If witnesses are recorded, or if the act appears in ritual texts, then the language seeming to depict a
symbolic act is more likely to actually witness a symbolic act.
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Malul, Legal Symbolism, 30–33.
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Malul, Legal Symbolism, 34.
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symbolize the particular result—what is the symbolic meaning of the figure of speech?).
This nuancing makes the category of “etymology” a bit more attuned to the discussion of
figures of speech, and we will use them as stated here in our analysis of legal formulas
below.
Besides introducing the above important categories and distinctions, Malul carries
out an extended analysis of various surety formulas. For the time being we will note that
he leads with an outline of the basic features of surety (summarizing earlier studies), and
dissects seven surety formulas within the context of his larger study on symbolic
ceremonial acts.58 We will further consider his analysis of surety formulas in the ancient
Near East in our discussion of the debt and legal records themselves.
Surety in Other Works
At least two works on particular cultures, places, or periods include sections on
surety for debt. Edward Lipínski’s volume on the Aramaeans includes a discussion of
loans in ancient Aramaic texts and a discussion of the ‘rb pledge and sureties;
unfortunately, some of the documents he cites remain unpublished.59 Kevin McGeough’s
Exchange Relationships at Ugarit is an assessment and refinement of economic models
postulated as operant at Ugarit in particular and the ancient Near East more generally; in
that work, there is a short section on “Economic Activities Involving Debt and Credit.”60
There, McGeough notes four instances of loan records that list a guarantor.61
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Malul, Legal Symbolism, 209–285.
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Lipínski, The Aramaeans, 581–586.
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McGeough, Exchange Relationships at Ugarit, 199–201.
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McGeough, Exchange Relationships at Ugarit, 199–201.
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Historians of economics often discuss surety as they navigate other subjects (trade
and finance, debt and restoration, etc.). Klaas Veenhof, discussing financing and the role
of silver in debt markets, elaborates on the role of guarantors in the relevant debt-notes.62
Cornelia Wunsch has a short discussion of surety formulas in her discussion of private
debt records in the Neo-Babylonian period.63
A number of other narrowly-focused works also discuss surety. Grant Frame has
published on one tablet in the collection of Princeton Seminary, PTS 2061, but includes a
lengthy discussion of surety agreements.64 Muhammed Dandamaev, writing on slavery,
has a section on surety and pledges.65 Dandamaev follows earlier studies by Paul
Koschaker, Raymond Dougherty, Mariano San Nicolò, and Herbert Petschow;66 these
works are also often cited by many of the other authors mentioned already. Collectively,
they constitute the foundation for later studies of pledge and surety; they are frequently

Klaas Veenhof, “Silver and Credit in Old Assyrian Trade,” in Trade and Finance in Ancient
Mesopotamia: Proceedings for the First MOS Symposium (Leiden 1997), ed. Jan Gerrit Derksen, Uitgaven
van het Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te İstanbul 84, MOS Studies 1 (Istanbul:
Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul; Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije
Oosten, 1999), 59. Veenhof writes, “Occasionally such contracts mention a guarantor, rarely a pledge.”
62

Cornelia Wunsch, “Debt, Interest, Pledge and Forfeiture in the Neo-Babylonian and Early
Achaemenid Period: The Evidence from Private Archives,” in Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient
Near East, ed. Michael Hudson and Marc Van De Mieroop, International Scholars Conference on Ancient
Near Eastern Economies 3 (Bethesda: CDL, 2002), 233–234.
63

Grant Frame, “A Neo-Babylonian Tablet,” 112–116, 123–130; Aaron Skaist, The Old
Babylonian Loan Contract: Its History and Geography (Jerusalem: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1994).
64

65

Mohammed Dandamaev, Slavery in Babylonia: From Nabopolassar to Alexander the Great
(626-331 B C), ed. Marvin A. Powell, trans. Victoria A. Powell (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1984), 157–158 (surety) and 157–180 (pledges).
66
Dougherty, “The Babylonian Principle of Suretyship”; Herbert Petschow, “Zum
Neubabylonische Bürgschaftsrecht,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vorderasiatische Archäologie 53
(1959): 241–47; Mariano San Nicolò, Zur Nachbürgschaft in den Keilschrifturkunden und in den gräkoägyptischen Papyri, SBAW 6 (München: C. H. Beck, 1937).
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cited as early descriptions of Gestellungsbürgschaft as the quintessential form of ancient
Near Eastern surety.
In short, there is a substantial body of scholarship that has addressed surety for
debt in a variety of contexts (legal and economic history especially). While we have not
yet traced out the nuances of the presentations of surety for debt in that scholarship, we
have noted some of the main distinctions (Gestellungsbürgschaft vs. other types of
surety) and analytical categories (symbolic ceremonialism). Further attention to the
details of these works will be incorporated into our examination of the surety documents
themselves.
Excursus: Is a Comparative Study Possible? Some Problems and a
Way Forward
We return now to the difficulties with a comparative study, in order to establish an
unimpeachable method for the comparisons that we later draw. The two problems with
the data that we mentioned earlier (i.e., that the records are not representative and not
normative) are not the only difficulties. Historically, scholarship has tended to overemphasize biblical parallels to ancient Near Eastern phenomena.67 Partly because of this
tendency, some scholars have (rightfully) argued for considerably more strictures on
comparative studies. The interpreter must first thoroughly examine the biblical
evidence.68 A similarity in itself is not sufficient grounds to justify a study of historical

See Tremper Longman III, “Evangelicals and the Comparative Method,” in Creator, Redeemer,
Consummator: A Festschrift for Meredith G. Kline, ed. Howard Griffith and John R. Muether (Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 2000), 33-42; Meir Malul, The Comparative Method in Ancient Near Eastern and
Biblical Studies, AOAT 227 (Neukirchn-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1990); Shemaryahu Talmon, “The
‘Comparative Method’ in Biblical Interpretation—Principles and Problems,” in Congress Volume:
Göttingen, 1977, VTSup 29 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 310-356.
67

68
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Talmon, “The ‘Comparative Method,’” see especially 356.
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influence. For studies that postulate historical influence (direct or indirect) that resulted in
an observed similarity, a number of tests must be completed by the researcher before
making any comparisons at all. These tests include the test for the “nature and type of
connection,” the test for “coincidence versus uniqueness,” and the test for
“corroboration.”69 Each of the three above conditions must be met before one may draw
strong conclusions about one of the sources on the basis of the other.
Meeting the conditions for a strong historical comparison are difficult. The
temporal and spatial distances between the proverbs and the debt records are significant.
This is true regardless of how one dates Proverbs—the span covered by the ancient Near
Eastern records ensures that one end of the spectrum or the other will be hundreds of
years removed from the proverbs. This gap raises a number of difficulties, especially for
the third test, “corroboration.” It would be difficult to prove that the historical conditions
over some hundreds or thousands of years were indeed conducive to the flow of
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Malul, The Comparative Method, 89-112. The reader may benefit from a short summary of
Malul’s proposed tests. The first has to do with the kind of access the biblical authors may have had to
other material and the question of whether the connection was direct (A – B), mediated (A – C – B), or the
result of some other commonality (such as tradition). The second test involves checking for whether a
similarity exists because common kinds of things (e.g. telling stories about floods or the search for a wife)
involve particular elements because they have to (regardless of culture), or whether that similarity is unique
(cannot be explained as the result of a coincidence). In the third test, “corroboration,” the scholar must
establish that the right historical conditions existed for exchange between the two cultures under
consideration, and for an exchange with respect to the similar phenomena she wants to examine in
particular.
The reader will note that we are accepting these “tests” in a seemingly uncritical way. The present
work does not permit a full discussion of the array of comparative methodologies, since even a cursory
discussion would require at least another chapter and deviate too far from our purposes, namely, to see
whether the extra-biblical material can elucidate the proverbs on surety (and how). After a careful reading
of Malul’s The Comparative Method, this author feels comfortable admitting Malul’s claim(s) that the tests
summarized above should in fact be met to satisfy the conditions for a comparative study. The reader who
differs should consider again the many observable pitfalls in comparative work mentioned by Malul and
Talmon in their assessments of comparative methodology.
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influence—particularly with respect to surety—from one culture to another (or from
some third source into two in which surety is attested).
It would also be difficult to meet the conditions of the other two tests. The second
test requires that one demonstrate that the similarities are not the result of mere
coincidence; since surety occurs in legal context across the span of history and requires
some contractual obligation of a third party (which was probably solemnized throughout
the ancient Near East by some kind of legal-symbolic ceremony), the odds of coincidence
are somewhat higher. The test for the nature and type of connection is also challenging.
Again, the evidence is gapped far enough temporally and spatially that it would be
difficult to establish the right intermediary historical conditions for an exchange.
There is one further difficulty, namely, the problem of comparing incomparables.
This concern is also raised by Malul; the critique is particularly relevant to the study at
hand.70 We are attempting a comparison of a small body of wisdom sayings (that
probably cannot be taken as statistically representative of surety in Israel) with a body of
other ancient Near Eastern evidence made up mostly of private legal contracts or records
(again, not representative). These two sets of evidence are from different genres and
separated by time and space (years and miles with magnitudes in the hundreds). Is this a
fatal flaw?
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Malul, The Comparative Method, 37-38. A particular example he mentions later in the work (p.
69) is Nuzian “wife-sister” contracts that were extrapolated from a small evidential base (a handful of
contracts) as evidence for a “wife-sister” legal custom throughout the ancient Near East (wherein the wife
was adopted to ensure certain inheritance rights). The problem with this is that a private legal document is
just a particular inflection of some kind of agreement, not a representative of some custom—the private
legal document is not comparable to a general legal custom.
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It is not necessary that this study falter on the grounds of comparing
incomparables. It also does not need to fulfill our proposed conditions for inferring a
historical link between the ancient Near Eastern sources and the Bible (or vice versa, or
of the influence of some unknown third source—perhaps an unpreserved law on surety—
upon both). A “contextual” comparative approach may be used—one that does not
depend upon proving a historical link.71
The contextual method takes as given that the Old Testament and the ancient Near
East are participants in a shared cultural environment. It is particularly fitting for our
study for two reasons. First, the wide attestation of surety arrangements in remarkably
similar terms is so massive that the evidence speaks for itself. It is almost brute fact that
the practice was known across multiple languages and cultural groups. We have already
outlined the documents, but we will observe in the next chapter even more concrete
evidence of the attestation of surety throughout the region. Second, the presence of the
same mass of evidence reduces the need to depend so much on the tests we have now
identified.
The third way in which the contextual method is quite appropriate is related to the
second. We are not dealing with just a handful of texts. In the case that there were, say,
five or ten attestations of a seeming parallel in the Old Testament and some other ancient
Near Eastern culture, it would be far more important to demonstrate in great detail the
manner in which these parallel features were connected. In the case of surety, though,
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Malul, The Comparative Method, 28-30 and especially note 19. The contextual method takes as
given that the Old Testament and ancient Near Eastern sources arise in an at least partially shared cultural
environment.
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there are hundreds of ancient Near Eastern texts that attest to the practice and more than
just one or two biblical texts. The odds of the surety arrangements in the ancient Near
East being unrelated given their common vocabulary and thematic links are so low as to
make this an untenable position.72 The other possible explanatory theory (that the surety
records are unrelated to one another and to the proverbs) flies in the face of the evidence
from the very beginning. On the grounds of the massive attestation of surety
arrangements, the unlikelihood of their being unrelated, and the difference between this
and other comparative cases, we will rest our argument for a contextual method that
assumes a common cultural background and the regular practice of surety throughout
the region.
We have already noted the genre problem. However, the distance between the
proverbs and the legal records is not unbridgeable. First, the body of evidence, while not
entirely representative, is much larger than other cases where the “incomparables”
critique is leveled. It is possible to consider them as records of variations upon social or
legal customs.73 The same is true of the proverbs—they represent at the very least some
variation upon the institution of surety in Israel. As representation of variations within a

72
The double negative is intentional. If one were to assign probabilities to the Hebrew and
Ugaritic roots ʿrb being unrelated, or the use of “striking hands” in the Neo-Assyrian, Aramaic, and
Hebrew texts being unrelated, and multiply these (even if the probabilities were rather high), it quickly
becomes unlikely that all of these features are unrelated.

“True, the Mesopotamian legal documents are private contracts… one, therefore, should not
take the frequent variations in clauses attested in various documents as evidence of the existence of certain
customs or laws. But equally one may not ignore the fact that these variations are within a certain
identifiable framework of some social custom, within which the two parties operated and according to its
rules and conventions they contracted their private agreement. Indeed, one should avoid comparing
individual private legal documents with the biblical evidence; but there need be no limitation in using for
comparison a group of private documents out of which one can glean the accepted legal and social
framework, a reflection of which he would then try to find in the Old Testament.” See Malul, The
Comparative Method, 72-73.
73
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legal framework, the proverbs and ancient Near Eastern records are brought more onto
the same level. This also ameliorates the problem of a set of evidence that is not
“representative.” The records do not need to be “representative” in the same way that
would be required by a statistical study—they may be taken as representative enough in
that they reflect particular instantiations of the wider practices of providing and obtaining
sureties for obligations.
The contextual approach disarms the potentially defeating critique of separation in
time and space. There are limitations to this approach, however. We will not be able to
suggest that the very same customs attested in the extra-biblical records asserted
influence on the proverbs and draw conclusions on these grounds. They were only part of
the same historical stream, within which there were variations. However, given the
relative nearness of the proverbs to the ancient Near Eastern records, the comparisons
that we can draw will be stronger than those that one could draw when comparing surety
in the proverbs to surety in the United States at the present. In short, we may hope to use
the ancient Near Eastern records to clarify the meaning of the proverbs, but not in such a
way that suggests direct influence of the ancient Near Eastern texts upon the proverbs.
We will use the extra-biblical texts mostly as a heuristic and to elucidate some of the
grammatical difficulties we discovered in chapter I.
The above methodological considerations mitigate several problems with a
comparative study of the Proverbs and ancient Near Eastern lending records. We have
already addressed the problem of comparing incomparables. We have also considered
whether to argue for historical influence from the ancient Near East into the practice of
surety for debt in Israel—this seems difficult, and we will shy away from any such
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project. However, an approach that assumes a common cultural background for the
Proverbs and ancient Near Eastern texts will allow a comparison of the legal symbolism
of surety in Proverbs and extra-biblical records. This will at least allow us to pay
attention to similarities and differences in the language with which the sources
communicate about surety and to compare the symbolic functions of that language.
In this chapter, we discovered that there are many records pertaining to surety and
that they are widely dispersed. The body of scholarship on these records, while somewhat
fragmented, is somewhat accessible and seems to have steadily grown. Given this body
of scholarship and the existence of records on debt that number into the thousands and
the regular (though not ubiquitous) presence of surety in these records, it seems odd that
ancient Near Eastern surety agreements have played very little in the interpretation of the
proverbs on surety for debt. Armed with an increased knowledge of the ancient records
and with what we hope is a suitable methodological toolkit, we will now turn to an
examination of the extra-biblical records themselves.

`

CHAPTER THREE
SELECTED ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS
In this chapter we will examine records of surety agreements from across a wide swath of
the ancient Near East. This part of our study is not, and indeed cannot be, comprehensive.
The primary sources have been published piecemeal (or left unpublished) over the last
hundred years or so, and there are simply too many to track down all of them. We hope to
assemble in this section a smaller sample of the texts that will showcase a variety of
surety formulae. We will engage them directly through transcriptions and translations as
far as is possible. After discussing the basic outlines of each text, we will examine them
from the angle of symbolic acts and legal symbolism. Under this heading, we will address
two questions:
1. Does the surety agreement under discussion reflect a symbolic act? Can the
surety arrangement be construed as reflecting a performable legal act?
2. What does the surety agreement symbolize about the relationships of the
involved parties (lender, creditor, and surety) to one another?
The chapter will conclude with an overview of its key findings, namely, that surety
formulae that may seem to reflect a symbolic act in fact do not, and that the relationships
symbolized between the creditor, lender, and debtor are varied.
Old Babylonian Texts
In Old Babylonian, there are a variety of phrases associated with surety. Some examples
include: qātātim leqûm (“to take hands”), qaqqadam kullum (“to hold the head”), and qati
X nasḫat (“the hand of X is removed).1 We will focus on the first of these forms with

Westbrook, “The Old Babylonian Period,” 79–81. These formulae (especially qātātim leqûm) are
often written as Sumerian logograms. See CAD L, 131, 145; šu ba.an.ti = leqûm, “to take,” and šu.dù/du8.a
= qātātum, hands. I have indicated these by a standard type-face, with transcribed Akkadian syllabic text in
italics.
1
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only passing references to the others, since qātātim leqûm is “the suretyship expression
par excellence of the OB period.”2
Instances of these phrases are still being discovered in current research; Anne
Goddeeris, in her recent Tablets from Kisurra in the Collections of the British Museum,
has brought to light three previously unpublished contracts that record a surety agreement
(Goddeeris 3, 5, and 29).3 We will examine each of these in an abridged form as there are
many lines of irrelevant detail.
Goddeeris 54
[amount of grain + PN1]
šu ba.an.ti
šu.˹dù.a˺ A-lu-kum šeš.a.ni
ù En-nam-dEN.Zu
dumu Šu-dNi[saba] šu ba.an.ti
[witnesses and seal]

Line
1-4
5

9-23

Translation: “PN1 has taken grain… PN2 and PN3… take hands.”
This text preserves a barley loan, the surety formula, and witnesses of the agreement. The
surety formula is šu.dù.a (qātātim) + PN2 and PN3 (guarantors) + šu ba.an.ti (ilqû, 3mp
from leqûm). PN2 and PN3 “took hands.” Somewhat confusingly, šu ba.an.ti is also used

2

Malul, Legal Symbolism, 219.

Goddeeris, Tablets from Kisurra. “Goddeeris + number” will refer to the numbers that Goddeeris
has assigned to the texts in her work, but for the reader’s convenience page numbers are also provided. See
also Skaist, The Old Babylonian Loan Contract, 31-41 for a discussion of the features and distribution of
loans of the same type. Skaist, Old Bablonian Loan Contract, 37, says that ur5-ra loans such as these “all…
stipulated that interest was to be paid.” Of the two exceptions he cites, one is from Kisurra. Since none of
the three loans from Goddeeris stipulate interest, we can add three more exceptions (Goddeeris 3, 5, 29) to
Skaist’s for a total of five. According to Skaist, Old Babylonian Loan Contract, 39-40, ur5-ra loans (a sort
of grain or barley loan) such as these were outmoded by c. 1860 BCE. Only Goddeeris 5 preserves a date
(“the year that ra-mi-im…”) but this king’s name appears to be otherwise unattested. On the evidence
presented by Skaist, we suggest—with an abundance of caution—that Goddeeris 3, 5, and 29 may be dated
earlier than 1870 BCE. The ambitious scholar who would undertake a thorough study of the orthography
and persons named in the texts may arrive at a more precise and better-substantiated date.
3

4
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to indicate the borrower’s reception of the loan or obligation; the borrower “took” or
“received” (ilqe, 3ms) the goods—in this case, grain.5 Another text preserves a slightly
different iteration of the surety arrangement.
Goddeeris 36
[amount of grain + PN1]
šu ba.an.ti
˹šu˺.[dù].a
Zu-[úr]-zu- ˹ru˺-um
[son of PN3]
[witnesses]

Line
1-4
5

9-18

Translation: “PN1 has taken grain… PN2 [took] hands.”
In this contract, šu ba.an.ti (ilqe) occurs just once and indicates merely that the borrower
has received the loan. We find nowhere the second, expected occurrence of leqûm. This
poses an important question: has the verb been elided, or should we read qātātim + PN2
as a verbless sentence, “PN2 is the guarantor”? The astute reader will note that we have
already disclosed a preference for the first option in the translation above. There are two
reasons for our choice. First, the word order is unexpected for a predicate construction.7
Second, there is at least one other case where the verb seems to be elided in a surety
agreement.8 The formula qātātim leqûm was evidently so well-known that the verb could
be left out (although this seems the exception rather than the rule).
Another tablet demonstrates the more expected form.

This occurrence of leqûm is not exceptional, but rather, a standard way to express the borrower’s
having received the loan.
5

6

Goddeeris, Tablets from Kisurra, 93.

7
On word order in non-verbal clauses, see John Huehnergard, “On Verbless Clauses in
Akkadian,” ZA 76 (1986): 218–49; Eran Cohen, “Addenda to Non-Verbal Clauses in Old Babylonian,” JSS
50 (2005): 247–79.
8
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Goddeeris 299
šu.dù.a
I-din-dIškur lú.túg
Gu-pa-ni
šu ba.an.ti
[witnesses]

Line
1

5-15

Translation: “PN2 has taken the hands of PN1, the ‘washerman…’”
This final contract from Kisurra further illustrates the flexibility of surety formulae. In
this case, the “hands” belong to the beneficiary of the surety. It is also worth noting that
the surety in this case is not attached to a loan agreement. It is entirely free-standing. PN1
(Iddin-Adad) was under some obligation for which he sought (or was required to seek) a
guarantor.
We will examine just one more text and then proceed to a discussion of the surety
phrase qātātim leqûm. YOS 14 158 preserves a surety arrangement in which two
borrowers seek a surety for a silver loan.
YOS 14 15810
[PN1 and PN2 silver
from PN3]
šu ba.an.ti
PN4 ki PN3
qá-ta-ti-šu-nu il-qé-e-ma
[describes flight of PN1 and PN2
PN4 pays PN3, etc.]

Line
1

5

7-29

Translation: PN1 and PN2 have taken x silver from PN3; PN4 has guaranteed [for
them] to PN3 [lit. “has taken their hands”]…

9

Goddeeris, Tablets from Kisurra, 111.

10
I have consulted the line drawing of this tablet in YOS 14 as well as CAD Q, 169, where there is
a summary translation. The tablet is in Old Babylonian cursive and is difficult to read. The transcription is
my own, but I have used the information in CAD as a heuristic. The sign for il on line six is uncertain and
although I have indicated il it could just as easily be a variant of il5.
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In this text, the “hands” are even more clearly those of the debtors, since there is no other
masculine plural referent available for the suffix. The borrowers have run away and PN4
pays back the silver.
A concise summary of the various formulations of the surety phrase in the texts
above is as follows:


šu.dù.a (qātātim) + guarantor(s) + šu ba.an.ti (leqûm)



šu.dù.a (qātātim) + guarantor(s) (no verb)



šu.dù.a (qātātim) + debtor + guarantor(s) + šu ba.an.ti (leqûm)



Guarantor itti (with/from) lender + qá-ta-ti-šu-nu (qātātim + possessive
suffix) + il-qé-e-ma (preterite).11

In all of these cases, the “hands” are the persistent element. The verbal relationship of the
guarantor to the lender may be expressed with itti or go unexpressed. The “hands” may
be indefinite or distinctly those of the debtor. The verb leqûm may be elided.
Symbolic Acts and Legal Symbolism
Because of the “performability” criteria for symbolic acts given above, the
meaning of qātātim leqûm rests on its hands, not the verbal form. If we demonstrate that
qātātum should be taken literally as “hands,” then the qātātim leqûm is a performable
act.12 However, if the primary meaning of qātātum is “protection,” or “suretyship,” or

11

Again, we have presented a selection of the variants. For more examples of these and other
iterations, see CAD Q, 168-171; AbB 1 101:9, 2 113, 7 75, 9 269; ARM 8 63:1, 8 64:3, 8 68:1; BAP 61;
BIN 7 210; CT 6 32b:10, 8 33a, 48 108, 52 75:5; PBS 8/2 207; UET 5 425; VAS 8 26:14; YOS 2 27:6, 8
3:6, 8 11:7, 8 15:6, 8 19:7, 8 27:7, 8 28:8, 8 33:7, 8 46:8, 8 49:6, 12 444:4, 13 25:13, 13 273, 14 299:1. The
most recent secondary literature is (again) Malul, Legal Symbolism, 219–252; Westbrook, “The Old
Babylonian Period,” 79–83; Skaist, The Old Babylonian Loan Contract.
12

Prima facie, it seems to meet most of the other criteria—there are witnesses in the contracts, one
can imagine “taking hands” as carried out intentionally and solemnly. The preterite verbal form of our
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some other such abstract and secondary meaning, then qātātim leqûm is not in fact
performable (by virtue of not being physical or gestural).
Malul argues that given the primarily abstract meaning of “hands” in the other
surety formulas, it is likely not to mean “hands” in the formula qātātim leqûm.13 The
primary meaning of qātātum in other surety formulations (with s ̣abātum, lapātum,
erēbum, or šuzuzzu) is quite clearly not literal, but rather abstract. Westbrook, too,
assumes an abstract reading of qātātum in a number of other contexts.14 Besides these
contextual hints, Malul uses a variety of lexical evidence to support an abstract reading of
qātātum. First, the plural form qātātum is not often used with reference to body parts; one
finds the dual much more often in such cases.15 Further, the feminine plural “occurs most
often in the context of suretyship… one may thus conclude that in the plural form
qātātum indicates a secondary rather than the primary meaning…”16 It turns out that
qātātim leqûm actually has no hands; qātātum are not hands, but a means of expressing
surety. This leads to a further question: why say “hands” at all? What does “hands”
indicate about the legal relationships between the surety and the debtor?
For a number of reasons, it seems most likely in these texts that qātātum
symbolizes power or control; indeed, “hands” are often symbolic of just this.17 In the case

example (also present in other texts) indicates a time-bound or completed action, the legal result would
obviously differ from the physical result.
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Malul, Legal Symbolism, 221–224.

14

Westbrook, “The Old Babylonian Period,” 79–80.

15

Malul, Legal Symbolism, 224–225.

16

Malul, Legal Symbolism, 225.

17

Malul, Legal Symbolism, 225–231.
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of suretyship in the OB context, we must remember that a common duty of the guarantor
was Gestellungsbürgschaft, the making available of the primary debtor or obliged party
(to pay, appear in court, and so forth). This indicates that the surety was expected to
exercise a degree of control over the borrower.
After the institution of a surety agreement, the guarantor is the responsible party.
The debtor seems to lose a certain amount of power, especially with respect to his own
movements. The guarantor has also received a certain kind of power from the lender.
While the lender will recoup her funds, the guarantor now has the right of regress to the
debtor in the case that he is obliged to pay on behalf of the debtor; in the case of YOS 14
158 above, the guarantor may “in the town where he sees [the debtors] take the silver
from whichever of them is solvent.”18
Old Assyrian Texts
Klaas Veenhof begins to discuss surety in Old Assyrian by mentioning that “the
guarantee has to date not been studied in detail…”19 This is a hurdle for us insofar as the
primary sources have not been as conveniently collated as one might like. However, there
is enough evidence for us to know that in Old Assyrian (as in Old Babylonian) there are a
variety of means available for expressing surety.20 Unsurprisingly, the “hands” come up
again in this context. There are “many letters and judicial records” that use the phrase

18

Westbrook, “The Old Babylonian Period,” 81–82; YOS 14 158.

19

Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian Period,” 104.

20

We will not examine AKT 2 31, 3 8; BIN 4 218, 6 123; CCT 3 8; EL 184, 186, 238, 254, 297,
306, 326; KKS 3, 5; KTH 15; O 3684; TC 3 67. On these, see Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian Period,” 113.
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qātātim lapātum, “to be registered as a guarantor.”21 Other surety formulae include
izēzum ana (“to stand for” + creditor) and apālum (“to answer for”), but there are
comparatively fewer instances of these formulae.22 We will, once again, focus on the
phrases that use qātātum. In the case of Old Assyrian (as in Old Baylonian), it is quite
clear that qātātum is being used with the secondary, abstract meaning “guarantor.”
Nearly fifty years ago, Paul Garelli published a tablet from the Musée Postal
(Paris) that reflects a pre-existing surety arrangement.23 The tablet is somewhat unique in
that the surety agreement comes partway through correspondence between two
individuals.
Garelli MP 124
[other correspondence]
a-na-ku a-na kaspim ša qá-ta-at
PN1 a-na PN2
al-ta-ap-at…
[continues]

Line
1-26

30

Translation: “I registered (altapat, Gt stem) for the silver as the guarantor of PN1
for PN2.”
The agreement is recorded from the guarantor’s perspective. The relationship of the
guarantor to the debtor uses a genitive (the guarantor is the “hands of” the debtor), and
the relationship between the guarantor and the lender is annotated with ana (“to” or

21

Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian Period,” 105.

22

Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian Period,” 106–108.

23

Paul Garelli, “Tablettes Cappadociennes de Collections Diverses (fin),” RA 60 (1966): 121–122.

24
Garelli reads al-ta-ap-tù on line 29 but the script is hardly legible for that line’s penultimate and
antepenultimate signs such that one could also read al-ta-pa-at kù.babbar. At any rate, this is the only way
that I can make sense of it. Veenhof seems to take the same reading since he parses the verb as a Gt first
person, see Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian Period,” 105-106.
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“for”).25 The relationship of the verb to the item owed (kaspum) is also expressed with
this preposition. Thus, to lapātum ana kaspim means to register “for (or as regards) the
debt or obligation of [item/amount] as the guarantor of PN.”
Another text, also recorded in the voice of the guarantor, states his obligation in a
different manner. There is no verbal form to indicate that the guarantor had registered or
been registered. Rather, the guarantor’s role as surety is expressed with a predicate.
BIN 6 109
5 ma.na [kù.babbar a-na P]N
ḫa-bu-lá-tí-ma a-na-[ku]
[qá]-ta-tim …

Line
5

Translation: “You owe 5 minas of silver to PN and I am guarantor.”
Here, we have a bare subject and predicate. The obligation of the borrower and the
amount are expressed and the guarantor states his obligation in the most concise manner
possible.26
Another text records the surety agreement from the perspective of the creditor or
some other third party.
AKT 3 5927
a-na ma-la tup-pí-im
ša i-na-a
qá-ta-tí-kà il-tap-tù
[continues]

Line
15 (reverse 1)

Translation: “according to the tablet for which your guarantor registered
himself.”28

Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian Period,” 105–106. Veenhof reads, “silver for which ‘I had (been
registered as D’s G on behalf of C.’”
25

26
Note here the normal word order for the predication (definite subject + predicate), in contrast to
Goddeeris 3 above.
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I have consulted Veenhof on lines 16-17.

28

See CAD M, vol. 1, 144.
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In this text, the relationship of the surety to the guarantor is also expressed with the
shorthand possessive “your guarantor.”
Symbolic Acts and Legal Symbolism
The verb lapātum occurs in these and other surety texts with the meaning “to register,” or
“to be registered.” It is not gestural in any way, and thus does not meet our criteria for a
symbolic act. There is no element of ceremonial symbolism to be explored here. The
unique elements of which one should take note are: a) the genitive or possessive
relationship between the surety and the debtor, and b) the use of the preposition ana for
both the relationship of the surety to the debtor and the creditor. As concerns the
relationship between the creditor, debtor, and surety, the genitival relationship between
the surety and the debtor seems to indicate that the benefit of the surety operated on
behalf of the debtor. The preposition ana, however, when used with reference to the
creditor, seems to indicate that the surety benefitted the lender as well.
Neo-Assyrian Texts
There are close to seventy Neo-Assyrian texts on surety.29 The title bēl qātāte is wellattested, but qātātim maḫas ̣um is also in use; there are seven instances of this second
phrase, upon which we will focus our study.30 Three are from Nimrud and four are from

See Radner, “The Neo-Assyrian Period,” 267–269; Karen Radner, Die Neuassyrischen
Privatrechtsurkunden Als Quelle Für Mensch Und Umwelt, State Archives of Assyria Studies 6 (Helsinki:
Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, 1997), 357–367. Die Neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden has a table
on 359-360 that summarizes surety in Neo-Assyrian texts.
29

Radner, Die Neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden, 363. We will rely upon Radner’s
transliterations, which may be found in Die Neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden, pages 363-368. Names
have been abbreviated. I wish to thank Dr. Radner for providing further comments about the morphology
and grammar of the surety phrase (private correspondence, March 2015), especially the forms of maḫas ̣um
30
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Assur; we will examine four of these (three from Nimrud then one from Assur). As with
other dialects, the surety formula is somewhat flexible. The first text we will examine
preserves a longer version, but it is abbreviated in others.
CTN 3 8
PN1 šu.2.meš
ša PN2 šu.2.meš
PN3 it-ta-ḫa-as ̣
[records that PN1 was released…]

Line
1

4f

Translation: “PN1 has struck the hands of PN2 [from] the hands of PN3.”31
The lengthy formula in this text is surety + qātātim ša + debtor + qātātim ša + lender +
maḫas ̣um. No loan obligation is present. The debtor was, upon the involvement of the
guarantor, released from the custody of the creditor. Other texts reflect that the
guarantor’s name may be repositioned.
CTN 3 9
šu.2.meš ša PN1
dumu PN2
PN3 dumu PN4
šu.2 PN5 lú.gal kur
i-ta-ha-s ̣a…32
[continues]

Line
1

5

Translation: “PN3, son of PN4, struck the hands of PN1, son of PN2, [from] the
hands of PN5 [PN5’s title].”

mentioned below, and for directing me to Jaako Hämeen-Anttila, A Sketch of Neo-Assyrian Grammar (see
below).
31

In Neo-Assyrian, the m of several roots assimilates to an infixed t or to the second root of the
consonant. The infixed t is not reflexive as one might expect; reflexive stems are indicated with the double
tt. The form it-ta-ḫa-as ̣ may be normalized ittaḫas ̣ (from imtaḫas ̣) and is a perfect form. See Jaako
Hämeen-Anttila, A Sketch of Neo-Assyrian Grammar, State Archives of Assyria Studies 13 (Helsinki: NeoAssyrian Text Corpus Project, 2000), 18–19, 88–90.
32
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Radner transcribes ha instead of the expected ḫa.
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The guarantor’s name is in the middle, but the formula is largely the same: qātātim ša +
debtor + guarantor + qātātim ša + lender + maḫas ̣um.
Another text specifies very clearly the responsibility of the guarantor and elides
mention of the debtor in the surety arrangement.
ND 3443
PN1 ana s ̣i-[i]b-ti
PN2 šu.2
ša PN3
i-ḫa-s ̣u-u-ni
PN4
mi-šu ša PN1
dumu PN5
PN2 i-s ̣a-bat-si
[PN2 responsible for death/flight]
[date, PN3 not further involved]

Line
1

5

10
11-19

Translation: “PN1 is for capture. PN2 struck the hand(s?) of PN3. PN2 has seized
PN4, the wife of PN1…”33
This surety arrangement seems to be bilateral—the debtor is not mentioned as involved in
its formulation. Since the tablet goes to extra lengths to clarify that the guarantor is
responsible for the death and flight of the lender and that the debtor is “for capture,” we
may conclude that the debtor was absent at least when the tablet was recorded, and
probably that the debtor did not need to be present for a guarantor and lender to enter into
an arrangement. In this case, the formula is simply: guarantor + qātātim ša + lender +
maḫās ̣um.
One last text provides evidence of another variation in which the lender is not
mentioned in the surety formula.

See Hämeen-Anttila, Neo-Assyrian Grammar, 112–113. i-ḫa-s ̣u-u-ni is another instance of the
assimilation of m to the second radical ḫ. The form may be normalized iḫḫas ̣ūni (perfect) with the addition
of the subjunctive ending, which marks the end of a subordinate clause.
33
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VAT 15461
šu.2.meš ša PN1
ša PN2
ša PN3
PN4 iḫ-ḫa-s ̣u-u-ni
[PN4 guarantor will return the
debtors upon creditor’s request]

Line
1

5-12

Translation: “PN4 has struck the hands of PN1, PN2, and PN3…”
This text names three debtors and the formula is: qātātim ša + debtor(s) + guarantor +
maḫās ̣um. The lender is mentioned only insofar as the agreement clarifies the guarantor’s
continuing obligation to the lender (i.e., the return of the debtors).
Symbolic Acts and Legal Symbolism
Radner thinks that the Neo-Assyrian texts do allude to symbolic acts. She argues that the
Old Babylonian texts (which we saw above mostly do not reflect a symbolic act) are not
analogous to the Neo-Assyrian texts. Meir Malul’s position is that the Neo-Assyrian
texts, too, do not reflect symbolic acts, but Radner argues that the nearest cognate for the
Neo-Assyrian surety phrase is the Middle Babylonian pūta maḫas ̣um (“to strike the
forehead”) which Malul does take as reflecting a symbolic ceremonial act.34 Since the
nearest cognate represents a symbolic act, the Neo-Assyrian texts do too. However, the
only evidence she cites to support this conclusion is the Middle Babylonian phrase and
Malul’s analysis of it.
The evidence does not seem strong enough to support Radner’s position that the
Neo-Assyrian surety formula qātātim maḫas ̣um reflects a symbolic act. First, despite the
seeming nearness of the pūta maḫas ̣um and qātātim maḫas ̣um, the Neo-Assyrian texts,

34
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Radner, Die Neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden, 362–363.
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like the Old Babylonian and Old Assyrian texts, also use qātātum in the plural with a
secondary, abstract meaning. This is especially the case in the well-attested phrase bēl
qātātim (lit., “owner/master of hands”). If a secondary meaning of qātātum is intended in
the texts, then the Neo-Assyrian phrase cannot reflect a symbolic act since it is, like the
Old Babylonian phrase, not performable.
Additionally, one can make the argument—on the grounds of the flexibility in the
surety formula—that any symbolic act to which the Neo-Assyrian texts do allude would
be hopelessly ambiguous and thus cannot reflect a symbolic ceremonial act. If qātātim
maḫas ̣um alludes to a symbolic act, then the guarantor carried out the same act to or with
both the lender and the debtor. (In ND 3443 the guarantor strikes the hand of the lender,
but in CTN 3 9 the guarantor strikes the hand of the borrower.) This means that the
symbolic act set up the same kind of legal arrangement between the guarantor and the
lender as it did between the guarantor and the debtor. Radner does not indicate that this is
so in her translation. Instead, she consistently uses the ambiguous “PN has guaranteed”
regardless of whether the guarantor has struck the hands of the lender or the debtor.35
Our criteria for a symbolic act demand that that act also be performed in the
presence of witnesses. However, only one of the Neo-Assyrian texts that uses qātātim
maḫas ̣um indicates the presence of witnesses (AO 4515 = TCL 9 62). The absence of
witnesses in the other texts does not mean that they were not there—this would be an
argument from silence. Nonetheless, it is a conspicuous absence. The presence of
witnesses in AO 4515 demonstrates that the practice of recording witnesses was

35

Radner, Die Neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden, 363–367. The word she consistently uses to
translate “striking hands” is “gebürgt.”
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sometimes in use. While it is possible that the scribe did not record witnesses due to a
lack of time, or space on the tablet, or other external factors, it is surprising given the
gravity of the surety agreement. This is not the strongest argument against qātātim
maḫas ̣um as a symbolic act, but it is evidence nonetheless.
Finally, the phrase qātātim maḫas ̣um stumbles upon the criteria of performability
in yet another way, especially in cases when both the lender and the debtor are
mentioned. One must take CTN 3 8 (the text Radner cites as having the fullest
preservation of the surety formula) as recording that the guarantor struck the hands of
both the debtor and the creditor. If this is the case, the text indicates that there are four
hands involved—the hands of the debtor and the hands of the creditor are plural in form.
So, are we to take it that the guarantor somehow strikes all four hands? Would the
creditor and the lender hold hands until the surety struck their hands apart? Or, would the
surety strike all four hands in turn? Both seem awkward. Furthermore, it is curious—
especially if the lender held the debtor in custody—that the ceremony would involve both
the lender and the debtor.
No, it seems better to take qātātum as something like “involvement” in both
cases. This dispels the difficulties with the ambiguity of the surety formula. The
guarantor can strike (probably in the sense of removing) the qātātum of either the creditor
or the debtor in the arrangement, intervening in their pre-existing arrangement by
distancing them from each other. The surety arrangement’s inherent for-the-benefit-of is
demonstrably relevant to the creditor, or to the debtor, or to both. Because the surety is a
third party, his entrance into the arrangement can help the creditor mitigate the risks of an
undesirable situation (in ND 3443, what appears to be the flight of PN1, the debtor). Also
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in ND 3443, the surety takes upon himself liability even for the death or flight of PN1 or
his wife (it is not clear which). Risk mitigation was known in the ancient world, too! But,
the involvement of the surety also engenders a certain amount of benefit for the primary
debtor, for the debtor may be released from custody (CTN 3 8).
In the Neo-Assyrian surety agreements, then, the phrase qātātim maḫas ̣um does
not reflect a symbolic act. It is probably a legal figure of speech and means something
like “to remove the involvement of.” It may be used with reference to either the lender or
the debtor, since both benefit in some way from the involvement of the surety.
Ugaritic Texts
There are several texts from Ugarit that mention a guarantor; of these, Kevin McGeough
cites the three that we will address most directly. They are simple lists of guarantors:
KTU 4.347 (= 3.20), 4.634, and 4.699 (= 3.26).36 KTU 4.634 is broken at the beginning of
most lines but appears to read as a list of guarantors, repeating PN + ʿrb five times. The
tablet preserves nothing other than this guarantee formula on every line, so it is difficult
to tell whether there were multiple unique guarantors for a single loan or whether they are
each responsible for different loans. The reading of this text remains highly tenuous
because of its condition—its value is primarily in attesting to the practice of guarantee at
Ugarit. KTU 4.699 is also quite damaged. McGeough thinks that it “is a record of silver
debts on (ʿl) certain people, and a record of guarantors (ʿrb).”37 This is probably correct,
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McGeough, Exchange Relationships at Ugarit, 199–200.
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McGeough, Exchange Relationships at Ugarit, 199.
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since the phrase ksp ʿl appears (with minimal reconstruction) on three lines. The noun
(ʿrbn) also appears in the text.
Helpfully, KTU 4.347 is not as broken as KTU 4.634 and KTU 4.699. It is a list of
guarantors and what appear to be debtors—since the tablet comes from the palace
archives, we can probably operate on the assumption that the palace was the primary
creditor for these loans or obligations.38
KTU 4.34739
rišym . dt . ʿrb
b . bnšhm
d̠mry . w . pt̠ pt̠ . ʿrb
b . yrm
ily . w . d̠mry . ʿrb
b . t̠ bʿm
ydn . bn . ilrpi
w . t̠ bʿm . ʿrb . b . ʿ[d]n
d̠mry . bn . yrm
ʿrb . b . adʿy

5

10

Translation: PN1 guaranteed for PN2. PN3 and PN4 guaranteed for PN5. PN6 and
PN3 guaranteed for PN7. PN8 son of PN9 and PN7 guaranteed for PN10. PN3 son of
PN5 guaranteed for PN11.
Some names (d̠mry, yrm, t̠ bʿm = PN3, PN5, and PN7) appear more than once. Two appear
to be related (line 9, d̠mry binu yrm = PN3 son of PN5). If this is so, then PN3 seems to
have gone surety for his father, PN5 (line 3-4). However, before reaching this conclusion
we must consider the way in which surety is formulated in Ugaritic.

On the role of the palace at Ugarit, see Kevin McGeough, “Ugaritic Commercial Practices,” in
A Common Cultural Heritage: Studies on Mesopotamia and the Biblical World in Honor of Barry L.
Eichler, ed. Grant Frame et al., AOAT 227 (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2011), 65–76; McGeough,
Exchange Relationships at Ugarit. On McGeough’s view, the palace was not the only creditor but one of
the three most important economic actors at Ugarit.
38

39

KTU 4.347 names many persons; I have abbreviated them in the following manner.
rišym
bnšhm d̠mry
pt̠ pt̠
yrm
ily
t̠ bʿm
ydn
ilrpi
ʿ[d]n
PN1
PN2
PN3
PN4
PN5
PN6
PN7
PN8
PN9
PN10
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In KTU 4.347, the beneficiary of the guarantee (the debtor) is indicated by the
formula b + PN.40 The surety was given to the advantage or benefit of the preposition’s
object, the debtor. We must very briefly discuss the vocalization of ʿrb in this formula.
While ʿrb could be vocalized either as a verb (3ms ʿaruba or 3mp ʿarubū, meaning “PN
guaranteed”) or a verbal adjective (ms ʿāribu, with PN meaning “PN is the guarantor”),
ʿrb should be understood as a verb. We have several reasons for taking this position.
There is a more concretized non-verbal form available (ʿrbn) that is attested in other
texts.41 This non-verbal form and the verbal form appear together in another text, which
reads spr ʿrbnm dt ʿrb (“document of guarantors who guarantee…”)42 This demonstrates
an awareness of the variants and the ability to select among them rather than default to
the participle when a subject is required. Finally, at least three texts besides KTU 4.347
preserve the formula ʿrb + b; because of the manner in which Ugaritic prepositions
function, the only possible meaning for the phrase in most contexts is “to guarantee.”43
However, since the basic meaning of the word ʿrb is “to enter,” we should consider it
from the standpoint of legal symbolism to see whether it not only denotes a surety but
also alludes to a symbolic act.

40
If the creditor is the palace, then b + PN cannot mean the creditor. A similar use is attested
elsewhere; see Pardee, “The Ugaritic Text 2106:10-18: A Bottomry Loan?”, 614 for the text and
discussion.
41

KTU 4.699:3; Pardee, “The Ugaritic Text 2106:10-18: A Bottomry Loan?,” 614.

42

Pardee, “The Ugaritic Text 2106:10-18: A Bottomry Loan?,” 614.

43
Pardee, “The Ugaritic Text 2106:10-18: A Bottomry Loan?,” 614–615. Pardee argues that the
Ugaritic prepositions are only ambiguous insofar as we are unable to reconstruct their meaning in context.
The surety formula always expresses a guarantee “for,” with one possible exception. It is possible in a
single case to read the object of the preposition not as the beneficiary of the surety but as the obligation
guaranteed, that is, the particular duty the surety guaranteed the obliged would fulfill.
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Symbolic Acts and Legal Symbolism
The surety is encoded in a phrase that is at first ambiguous as concerns its mode of
speech. Because ʿrb + b can mean either “to enter in/from” or “to guarantee (on behalf
of),” it could be either an allusion to a symbolic act or a legal figure of speech. However,
the evidence seems to weigh in favor of a legal figure of speech, especially when a
person follows as the object of the preposition. The primary evidence for taking ʿrb + b
as a legal figure of speech is the awkwardness of the construction with the preposition. It
is not at all clear how the surety might “enter from/in” the debtor in a manner that fulfills
the conditions we have provided for a symbolic ceremonial act. Because of this, it is best
to take ʿrb + b as a legal figure of speech, nothing more.
We will conclude this examination of Ugaritic surety texts by returning to the
question of familial relationships in sureties. If the names repeated in KTU 4.347 do
indeed refer to the same persons, then we have observed at least one case in which the
surety guarantees the obligation of a family member. Let this be noted—we will raise the
question of family ties in surety relationships at the conclusion of this chapter.
Aramaic Texts
We have consulted only three Aramaic contracts from the ancient Near East that
witness a surety arrangement. They remain unpublished, and as such our study of these
documents will rely upon secondary literature; fortunately, an article published by
Lipínski has transliterations of the texts.44 They are from in or around Gozan (Tell Halaf)

44
Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee.” Lipínski planned to publish the texts in D.
Homès-Fredericq, Paul Garelli, and Edward Lipínski, Archives D’un Centre Provincial de l’Empire
Assyrien, Documents du Proche-Orient ancien 2. See Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee,” 39,
note 1. However, the volume by Homès-Fredericq, Garelli, and Lipínski appears to be cancelled. Secondary
literature that mentions surety in Aramaic contracts relies upon the same article we use in this section.
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and Harran (both near the border between Turkey and Syria), and most likely date to the
early seventh century BCE.45 We will consider the two better-preserved texts, following
Lipínski’s transliteration and translation.46
O 3670
š ʿrn ʾl rpʾn
wšyr 10 b 10+3+2
wḥdy mḥʾ yd
š ʿryʾ hšhl
šhd[n ḥ]lrm
wnny
wḥs ̣dn 7

Line
1

5

Translation: Barley for PN1 and PN2. PN3 struck [the] hand. He delivered the
barley. Witness[es]: PN4 and PN5, and seven reapers.47
O 3658 48
š ʿrn 3 zph
zy hrn ʾl
bty w ʾl ḥgny
bršmš
mḥʾ yd

Line
1

5

Translation: 3 homers of barley, a loan of PN1 for PN2 and PN3. PN4 struck [the]
hand.

There are at least two more tablets that attest to a surety agreement. One is published in André
Lemaire, Nouvelles Tablettes Araméennes, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sciences Historiques et
Philologiques 2 (Geneva: Droz, 2001), but I have not been able to gain access to that volume. The other is
mentioned in passing by Lipínski in “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee,” 40.
45

Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee.”

46

I have slightly modified the translation of the first text to smooth it out, but the transliterations
remain exactly as they are given in Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee,” 40-41. The texts are
unpublished but we will use the designation O + number as does Lipínski.
47
The “seven reapers” clause may not indicate witnesses, but labor supplied by one of the
involved parties. See Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee,” 41.

The back of the tablet indicates witnesses but is illegible. See Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts
of Guarantee,” 41.
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Both of the loans appear to be small subsistence loans of one kind or another—the barley
may be for sowing or perhaps also for food. However, since the barley would be repaid
with barley in O 3670, it seems more likely that this was a loan for sowing as Lipínski
suggests. Rather than repeating his discussion about the identity of the involved parties
and other nuances, we will move on to an analysis of the surety.
In these texts, the surety is indicated with the phrase mḥʾ yd. This form may be a
G-stem 3ms, as we have indicated in the translations above.49 In both cases, the subject is
some masculine singular third party. We have also indicated the definite article for yd in
brackets. Lipínski takes this noun as definite in both cases, but it is actually ambiguous in
the texts.
The surety is thus expressed with the formula PN + mḥʾ + yd. In other words, the
surety is related to the verb “to strike” as the subject, and the “hand” is the object. It is
unclear how the hand is related to the subject—there is no indication in the syntax of
whether the hand might belong to the creditor, debtor, or surety. This uncertainty should
be born in mind despite Lipínski’s assertion that “the surety’s undertaking is described as
given verbally and accompanied not by a handshake but by a strike of the creditor’s hand
in order to show agreement and to signify the assumption of an obligation.”50 Striking a
hand is, for Lipínski, a symbolic legal act. However, it is not at all clear which party
struck a hand and to whom that hand belonged. Otherwise, there is nothing particularly

Although it may be possible to argue that one could also read the verbal form as a participle,
“[Bar-Šamaš or Ḥaddiy] is one who strikes a hand,” this seems more cumbersome.
49

50
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Lipínski, “Old Aramaic Contracts of Guarantee,” 39.
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noteworthy about the surety formulations in these texts. They are short and to the point—
the sort of contract for which one can only wish today!
Symbolic Acts and Legal Symbolism
It is unclear whether one ought to categorize the Aramaic phrase “to strike a hand” as an
allusion to a symbolic act, a technical legal expression, or as a legal figure of speech. As
it stands, the strike of a hand in the Aramaic contracts fulfills all of the tests that Malul
proposes for symbolic ceremonial acts. It is performable and of a limited duration.
Striking hands could be carried out with intention or purpose. It may have been
performed before witnesses (on the assumption that the witnesses named in the texts
would have seen it). The legal result (obligation of the surety to the creditor) differs from
the temporary physical result (contact between hands).
However, we noted above that there is ambiguity in the phrase. It could just as
easily be a legal figure of speech used to describe the relationship between the various
parties: surety, creditor, and debtor. Given the very limited corpus of texts available, this
ambiguity should persist. There is simply not enough evidence to follow Lipínski and
conclude that “striking hands” in the Aramaic texts is an allusion to a symbolic act rather
than a legal figure of speech.
The relationship of the three parties to one another is also unclear. The surety is
formulated as “PN struck the hand,” without the helpful prepositions or genitival
relationships that we have observed before. This statement of the guarantee having been
enacted is rather bald—the texts are not interested in portraying whom the surety was for
so much as that a surety arrangement had obtained.
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Surety and Legal Symbolism in Ancient Near Eastern Texts: A Summary
It is now possible to briefly summarize some of our findings about surety formulae. We
will first consider the matter of symbolic acts in the texts, and then the varied
relationships between the parties involved.
Symbolic Acts
The evidence that we have examined in this chapter supports the following
conclusion: a large proportion of texts that seem to preserve ceremonial symbolic acts do
not actually allude to such acts. Because of the requirements imposed by a responsible
definition of a ceremonial act, many of the surety formulae falter at the very first
criteria—performability. In our examination of the Old Babylonian texts, we came to the
conclusion that the rather literal reading of “hands” as “hands” does not meet the
meaning of that word as it is used in the Old Babylonian surety texts. In that case,
“hands” is a concretized abstract form meaning “guarantor,” and carries a nuance of
control or authority. The guarantor is called the “hands” partly because of his ability (and
responsibility) to control the movement of the debtor.
Likewise, in the Neo-Assyrian texts, the phrase “to strike hands” seems to call for
an abstract meaning of “hands,” this time with the nuance of involvement. The variability
in the object (debtor’s hands or creditor’s hands) of maḫas ̣um in the Neo-Assyrian texts
makes it impossible that the symbolic act indicated just one thing, such as the removal of
the debtor from the lender’s power. Between the seemingly abstract meaning of “hands”
and the variability of the surety formula, we concluded that the Neo-Assyrian texts are
more likely to reflect a legal figure of speech.
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In other cases, what is preserved as a surety formula cannot be an allusion to a
symbolic act because the verbs cannot be performed in the sense required for symbolic
acts. This is the case for both the Old Assyrian “to register as guarantor” and the Ugaritic
“to enter in/from.” The Old Assyrian formula is not performable. The Ugaritic phrase,
too, does not indicate a performable act because the ʿrb + b can have either the meaning
“to guarantee for” of “to enter in/from,” but not both.51 Even when the verb is
performable the text may be ambiguous. In the case of the Aramaic surety texts, the mode
of speech of the surety formula is ambiguous. Even though it might be possible to read
them as an allusion to a symbolic legal act, this is not certain. The phrase could just as
easily be a legal figure of speech.
Legal Symbolism
We also examined the ancient Near Eastern texts from the angle of legal
symbolism—what do the texts represent symbolically about the relationship between the
three parties: lender, debtor, and surety? If we can say anything about this, it is that the
relationships expressed by the surety formulae are quite diverse. We found that the
relationship of the surety to the debtor in the Old Babylonian texts is one of control (or
presumed control). This is partly because of the expectation in many ancient Near Eastern
sources that the surety would be able to make the debtor (or criminal, or slave, etc.)
available to pay their debt or fulfill their obligation. The use of “hands” as a stand-in for
“surety” or “guarantor” may reflect the early awareness that the surety took some power

51

Again, a symbolic ceremonial act would require that the preposition carry both meanings
simultaneously, since the debtor’s name follows the preposition. Pardee’s argument (see above) is that the
prepositions are only ambiguous insofar as we are unable to discern their meaning in a particular context.
In other words, the prepositions are ambiguous to learners of the language but not to its speakers or scribes.
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over the debtor. In both the Old Assyrian and Neo-Assyrian texts, the surety relationship
is portrayed as one that benefits both the surety and the debtor. The debtor is released,
and the surety unloads some of the risk of his relationship with the debtor. In the Ugaritic
texts, the surety benefits the debtor (these are so fragmentary, though, that this premise is
only tenuous).
We have now surveyed surety texts from across the ancient Near East that date
from around 1870 BCE to around 600 BCE. These texts show a great deal of diversity in
vocabulary and syntax, symbolic ceremonial acts, and the symbolic relationships of the
parties to one another. The above survey was not exhaustive, but it does constitute a wide
enough platform from which to launch our comparative study of Proverbs, the subject of
the next chapter.

`

CHAPTER FOUR
A CLOSER READING OF THE PROVERBS
In the preceding chapters, we examined the proverbs on surety for debt and the main
features of commentary on those proverbs. We surveyed the ancient Near Eastern texts
and established the methodological framework for our comparative work. We examined
some of the ancient Near Eastern texts, and the task of this final chapter is to re-read the
proverbs with reference to them.
We will also revisit our methodological framework. Since we now have more
details available, we will briefly argue that it may be possible to use the more stringent
historical comparative method with the proverbs and ancient Near Eastern records.
Nonetheless, most of the conclusions that we will reach about the proverbs are
independent of a successful argument for a historical link between them and the ancient
Near Eastern sources. The contextual method that we set out in chapter II, and the use the
extra-biblical texts as a heuristic, will support most of our conclusions.
We will analyze the proverbs on surety for debt with the same lenses that we
employed above for the ancient Near Eastern texts. That is, we will consider both
whether the proverbs do indeed reflect a symbolic act and the legal symbolism that
underlies that act. We will argue that the proverbs do not reflect a symbolic act, or at very
least that they cannot be so read if one wishes to avoid speculation. However, we can still
parse out legal symbolism in the figure of speech with which we are left. Along the way,
we will deal again with one of the earliest difficulties that we encountered in the
commentary tradition—the identity of the parties in the surety proverbs.
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In the final stage of this chapter, we will return to the five problems or open
questions that we identified in the first chapter. These are:
1. What is the motivation of the surety?
2. What is the mechanism of the surety? For what is the surety actually
responsible?
3. How was the surety enacted? Should we take the verbs ʿārab and tāqaʿ as
synonyms in the context of security for debt?
4. What is the basic structure of the surety agreement? Who holds what kind of
power over whom?
5. A lack of reference to extra-biblical evidence.
The evidence that we have discovered does not evenly bear on these issues. It is more
helpful on questions two through five than it is for the first one.
The Comparative Value of the Ancient Near Eastern Records
Above, we stated that our conclusions would not depend upon our proof of a historical
link between the proverbs and the ancient Near Eastern texts. Rather, the ancient Near
Eastern texts are helpful in a contextual methodological framework. The contextual
method suggests that the wider ancient Near East and the Old Testament shared, at least
to some degree, a common cultural environment. As long as we properly understand the
sub-context (as much as is possible) of the ancient Near Eastern texts and the biblical
text, it is possible to compare them to one another. We do not need to prove the historical
link to do this because evidence of the practice of surety is sufficiently massive and welldistributed in time and space.
Since we have now more closely examined the ancient Near Eastern sources, a
more detailed assessment of their comparative value is possible. We will still not suggest
that Proverbs is influenced directly by these texts, but instead that it and the other sources
are both heirs to a common tradition. We stated earlier that it would be difficult to fulfill
the tests for the “nature and type of connection” and “coincidence versus uniqueness.”
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However, we will now present in summary the argument that this is indeed possible; we
present the argument now only to support minor points of our conclusion. If the reader
finds it unconvincing or distracting, it may be skipped over or discarded without harm to
our argument as a whole.
The Question of a Historical Connection
One of the tests we identified above was the test for coincidence versus
uniqueness. We made the argument that coincidence is unlikely; we will now make the
argument that the similarities between the sources are sufficiently unique as to infer some
sort of historical link.
One of the features that we observed above is that in Old Assyrian, Neo-Assyrian,
Aramaic, and Hebrew texts, some variation upon the phrase “striking hands” or “taking
hands” is in use. Other Semitic languages demonstrate the ability to use other phrases to
denote a surety, so the occurrence of this phrase is quite unique. Additionally, the root ʿrb
is attested in both Ugaritic and Hebrew. Although it seems possible that this is a
coincidence, it is not likely to be so given that the word is used with the same meaning.
If the similarities are not coincidental, then what of the nature and type of
connection between the sources? In the case of the sources that we have discovered, it is
not at all likely that the biblical authors (or the sages) were reading the same records that
we presented above, or even other records like them. It is difficult to imagine a plausible
case in which the loan documents themselves and the Hebrew Bible are in direct contact.
What is plausible is that some shared tradition (or some presently undiscovered legal
source) was the cause of the similarities between the biblical texts and ancient Near
Eastern texts.
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We must also consider the way in which this shared tradition might have spread.
Both the biblical and ancient Near Eastern records indicate trade across ethnic and
political boundaries (this is so well attested that we will not adduce any evidence here). It
seems entirely plausible that international trade would have resulted in the spread of a
tradition about surety. Additionally, it is clear that one of the Semitic roots in which we
have been interested (ʿrb) was comprehensible across language groups.1
On the evidence now briefly presented, we suggest that there is a historical
connection between the proverbs on surety for debt and the ancient Near Eastern sources.
Positing such a link will allow us to reach conclusions that the contextual method alone
does not allow. Again, very few of our conclusions depend on such a link; these we will
indicate clearly for the reader.
Symbolic Acts and Legal Symbolism
In this section, we will revisit the question of whether the proverbs reflect a symbolic act
and what their language might symbolize about the relationships of the parties to one
another. Our trajectory in this section will take us past or through some of the difficulties
that we identified in the first chapter.

1
See 2 Kings 18:13-37; Isa 36:1-22. These texts record the same story of the Assyrian siege of
Jerusalem. Presumably, one of the Assyrians is bi-lingual and uses the Hebrew word ʾārab (in that context
“to make a deal”) as he speaks to the Jerusalemites. The dialogue suggests international exchange near the
later boundary date for our ancient Near Eastern sources (600’s BCE).
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Symbolic Acts
The consensus of the commentaries is that Prov 6:1 reflects a symbolic act, as do the
other proverbs on surety for debt.2 We will argue that this reading is not nearly as certain
as it has been made out to be. The commentaries assume that what appears to be an
allusion to a symbolic act is in fact an allusion to a symbolic act. There are, in fact, two
possible modes of speech for the phrase “striking hands” in the proverbs. The ancient
Near Eastern texts indicate that we are equally likely to find a legal figure of speech
instead of an allusion to a symbolic act. When examined more closely and subjected to
the criteria that we established above, tāqaʿ kap in the proverbs on surety is better read as
a legal figure of speech. Reading the phrase tāqaʿ kap as a symbolic act in fact requires
speculation about several of its necessary elements.
If the same tradition influenced the proverbs and the ancient Near Eastern texts, it
is much less likely that the proverbs on surety for debt reflect a symbolic act. In the texts
we examined above, qātātum (“hands”) was found to most often have a secondary,
abstract meaning in the context of surety agreements. “Striking hands” or “taking hands”
meant removing the power or involvement of a party. The question, of course, is whether
the internal biblical evidence supports this reading. If the biblical texts suggest a
secondary, abstract meaning for “hand(s),” then we must conclude that “striking hands”
in the biblical text is not reflective of a symbolic act. However, if “hands” in the primary
sense is meant, then the proverbs may reflect a symbolic act but will also have to meet
the other criteria we established above. We will re-examine the biblical evidence on its

We should again remember the distinction between the “reality” level in which symbolic acts
occur and the “literary” level in which they are reflected.
2
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own terms; the argument that we will make in the following section is not dependent on
our earlier argument for a historical connection.
Whether we can read tāqaʿ kap as an allusion to a symbolic act depends on the
meaning of kap. If kap has an abstract meaning (as it sometimes does), then the phrase
cannot be a symbolic act because it is not performable. If kap is being used in its primary
sense of palm or hand, then the “striking hands” may be performable and we can further
analyze it. Disappointingly, it is not at all clear which of these meanings for kap we
should understand in the surety proverbs. In the first place, the proverbs are not
homogenous in their use of tāqaʿ kap.
Prov 6:1
Prov 11:15
Prov 17:18
Prov 22:26

tāqaʿtā kapêkā (“you struck your two hands”)
toqêʿm (“striking”)
tô qēaʿ kap (“one who strikes a hand”)
bětō qʿê kāp (“as one who strikes a hand”)

Proverbs 6:1 is the only text that uses the dual (kapê).3 The other texts use a singular form
or elide the word. As an additional complicating factor, kap in the sense of “power” is
used in Prov 6:3, where the sage informs his charge, “you have fallen into the power
[kap] of your neighbor.” If we consider the possibility that the proverbs mean “hand”
when they use kap, we must also take into account that the same proverbs use kap with a
secondary or abstract meaning. Elsewhere, too, the Old Testament uses kap both literally
and figuratively (in the singular and dual/plural forms in which we find it in Proverbs).4 It

E. Kautzsch and A. E. Cowley, eds., Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,
1910), §91.
3

E.g. Gen 20:5, ûbǝniqyō n kapay (“and in the cleanness of my hands”); the phrase means, more or
less, “innocence.” In Ex 9:33 the dual form does mean “hands.” In Gen 40:11, the singular means “hand.”
In Judg 6:14, “Midian’s hand” means “Midian’s power.”
4
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is clear, then, that we cannot decide what kap means solely on the basis of its form. Given
the presence of both meanings in close proximity and in other biblical texts, it is
impossible to settle the question of the meaning of kap solely on the basis of its use in the
surety proverbs and in other texts. Even though the ancient Near Eastern texts indicate
that “hands” is used with an abstract meaning, to be fair to the proverbs we need to leave
open the possibility that they really do allude to a symbolic act.
What about the other part of this phrase, tāqaʿ? It is more helpful to us. The verb
tāqaʿ is almost always used with a concrete, physical object, thus strengthening the case
that the kap in Prov 6:1 means “hand.”5 However, there is one occurrence of tāqaʿ with
an abstract indirect object in another surety text, Job 17:3b, which reads miy hûʾ lǝyādiy
yittāqēaʿ (“who is the one that would strike himself into my hand?”). In this text, the
object of the verb is also the subject (the person), but he is striking himself into the power
of the speaker.6 This text makes no sense if one tries to read it as a physical action, for it
is in no way performable. It is a legal figure of speech. Despite the different verbal stem
and the use of a different word for “hand,” the existence of this other text that combines

5
Uses with a concrete object or no object include Gen 31:25; Ex 10:19; Num 10:3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
10; Josh 6:4, 8, 9, 13, 16, 20; Judg 3:21, 27; 4:21; 6:34; 7:18, 19, 20, 22; 16:14; 1 Sam 13:3; 31:10; 2 Sam
2:28; 18:14, 16; 20:1, 22, 1 Kg 1:34, 39; 2 Kg 9:13; 11:14; Isa 18:3; 22:23, 25; 27:13; Jer 4:5; 6:1; 6:3;
51:27; Eze 7:14; 33:3, 6; Hos 5:8; Joel 2:1, 15; Amos 3:6; Nah 3:19; Zech 9:14; Ps 47:2; 81:4; Neh 4:12; 1
Chron 10:10; 2 Chron 23:13. Admittedly, most of these mentions have to do with blowing trumpets, but the
point holds.
Proverbs represents the verb “to strike” with tāqaʿ kap instead of the also-available māḫaʾ kap or
māḫas ̣ kap (correspondents, respectively, to the Aramaic and Neo-Assyrian texts); the first phrase is
attested in Ps 98:8, Is 55:12, and Eze 25:6. While the forms appear to be equivalent to the surety formulae
in the ancient Near Eastern texts, it is entirely possible that a different meaning of “hand” is in play, as is a
different verb.

It could also be passive, i.e., “who is the one who would be struck into my hand.” In either case,
the meaning “into my hand” is not in doubt.
6
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tāqaʿ with kap introduces the possibility that “hand” in Prov 6:1 carries an abstract
meaning or means that the surety “strikes” himself into the power of the borrower.
The other proverbs are not very helpful. They use verbal adjectives instead of
finite verbal forms to indicate the surety; the acts are thus not “performable” because they
denote persons, not actions. The other surety proverbs are valuable for an analysis of
symbolic acts only insofar as they indicate that there existed persons who “struck hands,”
because there is present in them an additional degree of separation between the symbolic
act’s existence in reality and its existence in literature. We can only carry out an analysis
of a symbolic act in Prov 6:1.
Even on the assumption that Prov 6:1 does contain performable speech, it falters
at some of the other criteria we have established. First, the text does not record anything
about witnesses; we know nothing about how or where the act might have been
performed. This by itself limits any reading of Prov 6:1 as a symbolic act to the realm of
speculation. Second, if we allow the text from Job 17:3 to inform our understanding of
what “striking hands” symbolized, the act becomes ambiguous as in the Neo-Assyrian
texts. In Job 17:3, the legal figure of speech “striking” symbolizes that the guarantor
enters the power of the debtor, but in Proverbs we must presume that the guarantor strikes
his own hands. It is not at all clear how this could symbolize him entering the power of
the debtor as in Job 17:3. If we want to hold onto the hypothesis that the proverbs do
allude to a symbolic act, then we need to admit that the verb could be used in both a
figure of speech and as an allusion to a symbolic act.
In summary, it is not easy to argue—on the basis of either internal or external
evidence—that the proverbs on surety for debt do indeed allude to a symbolic act. It is
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impossible to argue for such a reading on the basis of external evidence, since the ancient
Near Eastern texts use related formulae that turn out to be no more than legal figures of
speech. The biblical evidence (Job 17:3) demonstrates that the verb tāqaʿ may occur in
contexts where it means only “to give surety” and is part of a legal figure of speech. Only
Prov 6:1 sustains analysis as an allusion to a symbolic act because the other proverbs
speak of persons, not actions. We also saw that in Hebrew as in the ancient Near Eastern
texts, kap is used in both a literal and figurative sense. And, the only other case in which
lamed occurs with tāqaʾ is figurative speech (see above, page 86). In light of this
evidence it is best to conclude that “striking hands” in the surety proverbs is a legal figure
of speech or a case in which it is not possible to distinguish between an allusion to a
symbolic act and a legal figure of speech.
Legal Symbolism in the Surety Proverbs
We may still analyze Prov 6:1-5 for legal symbolism: what does it indicate about the
relationships of the involved parties? However, we will first need to come to some
conclusion about the identity of the “stranger” and “neighbor” in Prov 6:1-5. We will also
have to come to some understanding of whether the two main verbal roots are equivalents
or whether they mean something different.
“Neighbor” and “Stranger”: Comparative and Internal Evidence
When we surveyed the interpretive options for the Proverbs on surety for debt, we noted
that there were two main schools of thought on the identity of the neighbor (rēaʿ) and
stranger (zār) in Prov 6:1. One possibility is that the “neighbor” and “stranger” are the
same person; Bruce Waltke and others argue for this reading. The other interpretive
option is that the neighbor is the lender and the stranger is the debtor. Michael Fox argues
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for this position, in the company of a handful of others. We will argue that the reading of
Fox and others is correct and that it is not necessary to identify the neighbor and the
stranger as the same individual. As evidence for this position, we suggest the following
three premises:
1. On the basis of the ancient Near Eastern texts, there are no grounds to think that
the debtor could release the surety from his obligation.
2. The only other use of the preposition lamed with tāqaʿ in the Bible presses one
towards this reading.
3. The Old Assyrian texts present a paradigm with which to understand the use of
the preposition lamed in Proverbs. The repeated preposition in 6:1 may indicate
both the lender and the borrower.
When we set out in our discussion of the Proverbs on surety for debt, we noted that the
different set of assumptions adopted by both Waltke and Fox tended to push their reading
of Prov 6:1 in different directions. Waltke assumes that it would be unethical for the
surety to seek release from his obligation from the lender and that the sage would not
advise such a course of action. Fox assumes that only the lender could release the surety.
Although the texts that we presented in chapter III do not indicate whether the
lender or borrower could release the surety, several other ancient Near Eastern texts are
more helpful. These indicate that the lender could exercise some discretion in whether
and how to exercise his right of regress to the guarantor in case the borrower did not pay
or went missing.7 In these texts, it is clearly the lender and not the debtor who holds the
power to release the surety from part or all of his obligation (although it seems that the
lender would be wont to do so). This is the more probable meaning of Prov 6:3, where
the sage states that the addressee has come into the power of their neighbor. Both the

EL 248, 306; O 3684; ICK 1 86; other unpublished texts. See Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian
Period,” 109–112.
7
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lender and the borrower may hold power over the surety in different ways, but only the
lender may release him (contra Waltke).
The lexical evidence, too, weighs in favor of distinguishing the “neighbor” and
“stranger” in Prov 6:1. The preposition lamed can be used with different senses. In Prov
6:1, the question is whether the two uses must have the same nuance.8 Fox argues that the
first lamed indicates the indirect object, while Waltke argues that it indicates the direct
object.9 The second occurrence of the preposition lamed (with tāqaʿ kap) is best
understood as indicating the beneficiary of the surety, the debtor.10 In fact, this is the way
the preposition is used in Job 17:3, the only other text in which the preposition lamed
occurs with the verb tāqaʿ. In that case, the object of the preposition is “my hand” and it
indicates that the surety has come into the power of the speaker, who is the debtor. The
evidence is not quite so clear with ʿārabtā lǝrēʿekā, but we note Fox’s argument that the
neighbor is the lender in Prov 17:18.11 The proverbs on surety for debt are so clearly

8

Bǝniy ʾim ʿārabtā lǝrēekā tāqaʿtā lazzār kapêka. The two occurrences of lamed are underlined.

9

See above, page 9-12 and notes.

10

11

The early versions and commentaries are not ambiguous about this.

Waltke notes that the early versions (LXX, Targum and Syriac) read the neighbor and stranger
as the same individual; he also states that they take the lamed in ʿārabtā lǝrēʿekā as indicative of the
beneficiary of the surety (see above, page 12, note 15). However, at least in the case of the LXX, this
reading is thrust upon the translators by the way in which they take the conditional of Prov 6:1. The LXX
takes 6:1a (“My son, if you have given surety for”) as the protasis and 6:1b (“you have struck your hands
for a stranger”) as the apodosis. However, this segmentation of the conditional makes it incumbent upon
the translator to equate the neighbor and stranger, because the second clause is essentially an interpretation
of the first. The decision of the LXX to read the neighbor as the beneficiary of the surety is necessitated by
another interpretive decision, namely the segmentation of the conditional.
Besides the possibility that the LXX is reading a different Semitic textual base, the protasis and
apodosis need not occur together in Prov 6:1 (the NIV takes all of 6:1 as the protasis, the NET takes 6:1-2
as the protasis). Prov 6:2 has two clauses that are clearly parallel (synonomous). If the protasis is 6:1 and
the apodosis is 6:2, then there is a nice symmetry between condition and result (there is also a 7/6 pattern if
one counts the words in each poetic line). The verbs in 6:1 are active, while those in 6:2 are passive. Prov
6:1 describes what the subject has done, and Prov 6:2 is descriptive of the results of those doings, which are
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related that it is unlikely that they would use different terminology for the involved
parties. The lamed in this first case is, then, indicative of the indirect object in some other
way.
In our initial discussion of Prov 6:1, we observed that a reading of the neighbor
and stranger as different persons undoes the tight syntactic parallelism of the two clauses.
This is much less of an obstacle in light of the ancient Near Eastern surety texts. Above,
we observed that the Old Assyrian texts employ the same preposition (ana) to indicate
the relationship of the surety to the debtor and to the creditor, respectively. This has not
been taken into account by interpreters of Proverbs. Although the two clauses of Prov 6:1
appear to be parallel, Prov 6:1b intensifies and clarifies the apodosis: “if you have given
surety to your neighbor, if you struck your hands for a stranger…”12
Verbal Parallels? tāqaʿ kap and ʿārab Reconsidered
Before proceeding any further, we also need to address the question raised in the first
chapter about whether the two verbal forms are parallel to one another or whether they
express different meanings. It is our position that the two forms are basically parallel to
one another and mean “to give surety.” “Striking hands” can be understood as a symbolic
legal gesture only if we are willing to speculate about it. It is not surprising that we would

beyond the control (because the subject is now passive) and intention (because the subject certainly did not
want to be ensnared) of the subject.
This mitigates the evidence of the earlier versions, because we are left with only a question: if the
early translators had differently understood the conditional, would they still have translated ʿārabtā
lǝrēʿekā with the neighbor as the beneficiary of the surety? There is no way to know. Waltke himself reads
Prov 6:1 as the protasis but does not discuss the implications this might have for other translations. See
Waltke, Proverbs 1-15, 325.
12

This is a different reading than that of Scott Harris, who does not differentiate between the
neighbor and the stranger. See above, page 13, note 17.
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discover more than one way of speaking about a surety arrangement; as in the other
ancient Near Eastern texts, there is more than one way to say that someone “went surety”
for or to another. In Hebrew, the verbs occur in close proximity in contexts that suggest
that they are parallel.
Legal Symbolism
In Prov 6:1, the lender is the rēaʿ, the neighbor. The preposition lamed is used to
denote the relationship of the surety to both the lender and the debtor. In the case of the
other proverbs, the identities of the lender and creditor as the zār and rēaʿ persist. Prov
11:15 uses ʿārābta zār to indicate that the zār is the debtor and beneficiary of the
guarantee. While the construction is different than in Prov 6:1, this is not a problem given
both the other biblical evidence and the flexibility of the placement of prepositions we
observed in some of the ancient Near Eastern texts. Prov 20:16 // Prov 27:13 also use
ʿārab zār with the same sense, with the stranger as the beneficiary of the surety. In this
case, the sage warns not against the hearer going surety, but rather that they should not
trust those who do.
Proverbs 17:18 uses the verbal adjective ʿō rēb and lipnê rēʿēhû to speak of the
person who gives surety before his neighbor. In this case, the presence of a different
preposition should not trouble us given the flexibility of surety formulae in the ancient
Near Eastern texts. The syntax of the verse cannot indicate that the neighbor is the
beneficiary. The preposition lipnê means “in the presence of.” In this text, the debtor is
unnamed and we do not know whether they are present. We saw in chapter III that the
debtor, presumably, does not have to be present at the institution of the surety
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arrangement. Prov 17:18 gives no indication of this, but if the debtor were absent this
would not be a problem.
The legal relationships of the zār to the surety in the proverbs seems to be one of
benefit. Although we suggested that the lamed in Prov 6:1b indicates the indirect object,
it could also be taken as a lamed of advantage without changing the meaning of the text.
However, if we admit the evidence from Job 17:3 and the extra-biblical texts, there may
also be a sense that the surety comes under the power of both the debtor and the lender.
Job 17:3 stands as evidence that one can strike oneself into the hand (power) of another.
Proverbs 22:26-27 indicates that the lender, though unnamed, retains power over the
surety.
The legal result of the surety agreement is, then, that a relationship of advantage is
instituted between the surety and the guarantor. The surety also provides something that
the lender needs or wants; the lender, too, benefits from the surety arrangement and
retains a certain amount of power over the surety (Prov 6:3). This is similar to the NeoAssyrian texts in which the surety arrangement is demonstrably for the benefit of both the
lender and the debtor.
Implications for Commentary
We will now return to the five problems that we named in the first chapter to see how our
study might bear on them.
The Motivation of the Surety
We turned up little that would help us understand what the motivation of the surety might
be. The ancient Near Eastern texts seem to indicate that members of the same family
sometimes provided surety for one another. In the texts that we examined above, only
`

94
those from Ugarit were any help in that they mentioned persons who seem to be related.
At Ugarit, perhaps persons within the same family gave surety for one another. However,
this does not carry over to the biblical texts, which specify the borrower as a zār who is
seemingly by definition outside the subject’s family.
Some of the commentators suggested that the surety was motivated by a sense of
charity.13 There is little or nothing in the ancient Near Eastern loan contracts that might
confirm this. However, the Wisdom of Ben Sira may allude both to such charitable
practice and to other profit-seeking motives (Sir 29:19).14 Because there is so little
evidence in the texts that we examined for either a charitable motive or a motive of profit,
we will leave the question of the surety’s motivation untouched.
The Mechanism of Surety
In the first chapter, we stated that the mechanism of surety is poorly defined: how did the
responsibility of the surety for the borrower work itself out on a practical level? The
commentary tradition indicates some nebulous responsibility for the borrower, and is
sometimes ambiguous as to whether the surety simply guaranteed to pay if the borrower
defaulted or whether the surety pledged some piece of real property. We will attempt to
clarify the responsibility of the surety to the lender and the borrower. Some commentaries
also suggested that surety developed historically and is not attested in the early history of
Israel; we noted this in the first chapter, but the question still stands: was surety always
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See above, page 24.
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Sandoval, Discourse of Wealth and Poverty, 111.
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practiced in Israel, and was it practiced in the same way? 15 We will examine the
mechanism of surety first and then the question of its historical development.
In addition to the repayment of a loan in default, it is also possible that the
proverbs on surety for debt have in mind Gestellungsbürgschaft as a responsibility of the
guarantor.16 This responsibility of the guarantor is attested throughout the ancient Near
East and requires that the guarantor ensure the presence of the debtor(s) so that they are
able to repay the lender. In contexts where there is not a financial arrangement but some
other obligation (appearance in court, etc.), Gestellungsbürgschaft also indicates the
guarantor’s responsibility to make sure his charge appears to fulfill that obligation. This
nuance of the surety for debt seems to be completely unmentioned in the exegesis of
Proverbs. This absence is surprising for another reason besides the appearance of this
obligation in the ancient Near Eastern texts; it seems to be the case that other biblical
evidence indicates that Gestellungsbürgschaft is one responsibility of the guarantor. The
Joseph cycle records Judah’s guarantee of Benjamin’s safety as, in effect, a guarantee of
his return to Jacob. Judah says, “If I do not bring him to you and put him before you…”
(Gen 43:7). There are, thus, two pieces of evidence for reading Gestellungsbürgschaft as
a responsibility of the surety in the proverbs: the ancient Near Eastern evidence and the
internal biblical evidence; it should be noted as another possible responsibility of the
guarantor alongside the straight repayment of the debt in the event of a default.

15
See above, page 24. The question of the historical development of surety is entirely beside the
point of the proverbs. We ask only because the commentaries raise the question.
16
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Nonetheless, repayment of the debt was almost certainly the other responsibility
of the surety for the borrower in the event of a default. The ancient Near Eastern texts
indicate that in the event of a default, the surety was obligated to repay the lender. In
YOS 14 158, the borrowers default and the surety pays in their stead.17 It is likely that the
surety had a right of regress to the borrowers, for YOS 14 158 says that the surety could
now “take the silver from whichever of [the borrowers] is solvent.”18
The Mechanism of Surety and History
Surety was probably not a late development, as some commentators suggest. Leo
Perdue writes,
Debt that required interest was originally disallowed (Lev. 22:25) but came to be
practiced at a later time (Lev. 25:26-27; Deut. 23:19-20). The borrowers joined
the social outcasts. A system of providing the lenders surety against what was
borrowed developed, although an item deemed to be necessary for life was
generally not offered. Instead, a pledge was usually given that was a symbol of
the guarantee of returning what was borrowed (Exod. 22:26-27; Deut. 24:10-13).
On occasion a poor person could persuade a wealthy neighbor or relative to
provide the surety (Prov. 6:1; 11:15; 17:18; 20:16; 22:26; 27:13). This type of
security system not only represents engagement in foolish behavior but also
points to the impoverished state of those finding themselves having to borrow
what they do not own. Charity toward the poor should not lead the prosperous
sage into providing them surety.19
The quotation by Perdue is an example of some of the issues we have pointed out in
Proverbs, including the equivocation of surety and pledge (lines 3-4 in the quotation).
More importantly, though, it suggests that the way in which Israel executed surety for

interest.
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YOS 14 158; Westbrook, “The Old Babylonian Period,” 81–82.
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YOS 14 158; Westbrook, “The Old Babylonian Period,” 81–82.

19

Perdue, Proverbs, 203. Leviticus 22:25 has to do with sacrifice, not prohibition of lending at
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debt changed with time, from an earlier period in which only pledges were used to a later
period in which third-party security became more common.
If there is a shared tradition apparent in the ancient Near Eastern texts and the
proverbs, then the development of surety in Israel’s history would be quite remarkable,
given the broad historical range across which the records attest to surety for debt in
Israel’s neighbors. Regardless of whether there was a development from loans that did
not bear interest to interest-bearing loans, surety is not dependent upon the interest of the
loan. Additionally, Judah’s guarantee of Benjamin’s safety in Genesis must be taken as
an early mention of surety in the Old Testament—albeit surety in the sense of
Gestellungsbürgschaft rather than surety for repayment of a loan. Job 17:3 provides
another (probably early) example of surety.
Perdue also suggests that the proverbs have in mind a “poor person” as the object
of the surety. This is unwarranted. There is nothing in the proverbs themselves to suggest
that some impoverished person is always, or even often, the beneficiary of the surety. The
ancient Near Eastern texts indicate that tremendous sums of money were lent and that a
surety was provided.20 Whether we can say with certainty this happened in Israel or not is
beside the point; it cannot be ruled out as a possibility because of an absence of evidence
(no secured loans to the wealthy are mentioned in Proverbs). The suggestion, then, that
the only loans mentioned in the Old Testament were charitable in nature is speculation.21
The poor were not necessarily the only recipients of surety.

20

BIN 6 109, see above page 62; the text indicates that the borrower owed 5 minas of silver. The
speaker is the guarantor.
21
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In any case, commentators who suggest that the practice of surety in Israel
developed over time both miss the point of the proverbs (which are not at all concerned
with the history of surety!) and ignore the possibility that surety was known throughout
the ancient Near East. Our suggestion that some common tradition influenced surety in
Israel carries just as much or more explanatory power as Perdue’s suggestion of historical
development because it better accounts for the evidence from Genesis, Job, and the extrabiblical texts.
The Meaning of ʿrb and tqʿ
We reached the conclusion that these two verbal forms are parallel in meaning.22 While
“striking hands” may be an allusion to a symbolic act, in Proverbs it is indistinguishable
from a legal figure of speech. Interpreting it as a symbolic act is speculative at best.
However, many of the commentators suggest without hesitation that tāqaʿ kap is an
allusion to a symbolic act.23 This conclusion is not warranted and should be excised or
presented with a good deal more caution.
Legal Relationships
In this chapter, we have suggested that the relationship that obtains between the debtor
and the surety is one of advantage for the debtor. If we admit Job 17:3 as evidence, then
the relationship between the debtor and the surety would also be one in which the surety
comes under the power of the debtor. The relationship of the surety to the lender is one in

22

23

This supports the conclusion of Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 212–213.

E.g., Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 213. Ellen Davis is one of the few who refrains from such a comment.
See Ellen Davis, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs, WBC (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox, 2000), 54–55.

`

99
which the surety is disadvantaged—the surety enters the “hand” of the lender (Prov 6:3).
By its warning against the consequences of giving surety, Prov 22:26-27 indicates that
the lender has a certain amount of control over the guarantor.
Lack of Reference to Extra-Biblical Evidence
At the outset of this study, we suggested that it was surprising that commentary on the
surety proverbs did not mention the extra-biblical evidence, given its wide attestation. It
is our hope that this thesis has successfully taken two steps towards remedying this
absence. We provided a summary of the secondary literature and argued that the ancient
Near Eastern sources are relevant, and we presented some of the ancient Near Eastern
texts in a form that we hope is accessible for those without substantial training in other
Semitic languages.
On one level, the lack of reference to ancient Near Eastern texts in commentary
on Proverbs is understandable given the barriers to incorporating them. The first barrier is
that the secondary literature is scattered through volumes on other subjects. Another
barrier is gaining access to the ancient Near Eastern texts. Some remain unpublished.
Those that are published are dispersed through a bewildering number of volumes.
Hopefully, this thesis has begun to disassemble both of these barriers. While our study
was limited, at least some of the relevant texts on surety for debt are now available
together in English translation.
We also argued that the ancient Near Eastern sources that are relevant to surety
for debt can elucidate the proverbs. While it appears to be the case that some common
tradition influenced both the extra-biblical texts and the proverbs on surety for debt, only
a few of our conclusions depend on such a historical connection. The ancient Near
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Eastern texts are also helpful as a heuristic in that they caution us against leaping to
conclusions about the mode of speech present in Proverbs.
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CONCLUSION
The major goal of this study was to demonstrate that ancient Near Eastern contracts,
lending records, and court proceedings clarify our understanding of the proverbs on
surety for debt. At the outset, we noted that there would be at least three results. The first
was that we would have brought new evidence to the table that would help decide
between scholarly positions on the relationships between the parties involved in a surety
agreement. We also suggested that some readings of surety agreements might be
disallowed by the comparative evidence. Finally, we suggested that the evidence might
open up interpretations of the proverbs on surety for debt that had not been considered;
the one new suggestion we made is that Gestellungsbürgschaft may have been a part of
surety arrangements.
This thesis has achieved each of these three with varying degrees of strength. We
argued on several grounds that a reading of Prov 6:1-5 in which the neighbor and stranger
are the same party is not the best reading. Rather, that these parties ought to be
understood as the lender and the borrower, respectively. The position of Waltke and
others—that the borrower could release the surety from their obligations—does not
account for the ancient Near Eastern evidence. The evidence that we discovered also
indicates that surety was not likely to have been a late development in the history of
Israel, as Perdue suggests. And, we suggested a new nuance for surety in proverbs,
namely Gestellungsbürgschaft, in which the guarantee not only repays a loan in the event
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of a default but ensures the presence of the obligated party at a time and place conducive
to the fulfillment of the obligation.
We were also able to argue on the basis of the comparative evidence that the
proverbs on surety for debt can only be taken as reflective of a ceremonial, symbolic act
if one is willing to speculate about them. When we apply stringent criteria, like those
discussed in chapter II, to the proverbs and ancient Near Eastern texts, the evidence for
some kind of widespread ceremonial act that instituted a surety agreement crumbles. The
common reading of the proverbs we examined, which posit a symbolic ceremonial act,
encounter difficulties when we take into account comparative evidence.
The conclusions that we have now summarized are the most important ones that
bear on the five difficulties in the interpretation of the surety proverbs. However, our
conclusions should be taken as somewhat tentative. One of the charges we lodged against
some commentators is that they have over-concluded (especially about some gesture or a
remunerative motivation for the surety). While we have accounted for more extra-biblical
evidence than some of the commentators, we did not conduct a comprehensive
investigation and will unabashedly say that as a result this study is selective and limited.
It should be understood in that way.
Probably, one of the first tasks for future research is a closer look at the other
ancient Near Eastern texts that we mentioned. We presented a handful of these texts, but
there are many more. A further study of these texts may confirm or negate some of our
conclusions, or lead in new directions. Also, while we presented in brief the argument
that the ancient Near Eastern texts and the proverbs on surety for debt were influenced by
a common tradition, we set up this argument in a cursory fashion because it was not
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necessary for most of our conclusions. It may be possible to extend this argument (along
linguistic lines, especially) given what appears to be the close relationship between the
surety formulae in Proverbs and the texts that we presented.
We began by saying that Proverbs is all about wisdom—and we hope to have
provided more context and clarifying information on a few of these wisdom sayings.
Even though their basic meaning is not in question, the surety proverbs are difficult,
nuanced, and occasionally confusing texts. If our study in any way helps the reader to
listen to and understand the voice of wisdom—or even to puzzle over it together with
us—then we are pleased with the result.
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Parrot, André, and Georges Dossin. Archives Royales de Mari. Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale: 1950-.
Perdue, Leo G. Proverbs. IBC. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2000.
Petschow, Herbert. “Zum Neubabylonische Bürgschaftsrect.” Zeitschrift Für Assyriologie
Und Vorderasiatische Archäologie 53 (1959): 241–47.
Publications of the Babylonian Section. University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia:
University Museum, 1911-.
Radner, Karen. Die Neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden Als Quelle Für Mensch Und
Umwelt. State Archives of Assyria Studies 6. Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus
Project, 1997.
———. “Neo-Assyrian Period.” Pages 883–910 in A History of Ancient Near Eastern
Law. Edited by Westbrook, Raymond. HdO 72:1. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
———. “The Neo-Assyrian Period.” Pages 265–88 in Security for Debt in Ancient Near
Eastern Law. Edited by Raymond Westbrook and Richard Jasnow. CHANE 9.
Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Roth, Martha T. Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. WAW 6. Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1995.

`

108
Sandoval, Timothy J. The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs.
Leiden: Brill, 2006.
San Nicolò, Mariano. Zur Nachbürgschaft in den Keilschrifturkunden und in den gräkoägyptischen Papyri. SBAW 6. München: C. H. Beck, 1937.
Scherer, Andreas. “Is the Selfish Man Wise?: Considerations of Context in Proverbs
10.1-22.16 with Special Regard to Surety, Bribery, and Friendship.” JSOT 76
(1997).
Schwáb, Zoltán S. Toward and Interpretation of the Book of Proverbs: Selfishness and
Secularity Reconsidered. JTISup 7. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2013.
Skaist, Aaron. The Old Babylonian Loan Contract: Its History and Geography.
Jerusalem: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1994.
Talmon, Shemaryahu. “The ‘Comparative Method’ in Biblical Interpretation—Principles
and Problems.” Pages 310-356 in Congress Volume: Göttingen, 1977. VTSup 29.
Leiden: Brill, 1978.
Textes Cunéiformes, Musées du Louvre. Paris: P. Guethner, 1910.
Ur Excavations: Texts. Joint Expedition of the British Museum and of the Museum of the
University of Pennsylvania to Mesopotamia. London: printed by order of the
trustees of the two museums, 1928-.
Van De Mieroop, Mark. “The Archive of Balmunamhe.” AfO 34 (1987): 1–29.
Veenhof, Klaas. “The Old Assyrian Period.” Pages 93–160 in Security for Debt in
Ancient Near Eastern Law. Edited by Raymond Westbrook and Richard Jasnow.
CHANE 9. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
———. “Silver and Credit in Old Assyrian Trade.” Trade and Finance in Ancient
Mesopotamia: Proceedings for the First MOS Symposium (Leiden 1997). Edited
by Jan Gerrit Derksen. Uitgaven van het Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch
Instituut te İstanbul 84, MOS Studies 1. Istanbul: Nederlands HistorischArchaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul; Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije
Oosten, 1999.
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